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Notes
NECESSITY OF JOINDER OF CoRPoRATIoN IN REPRESENTATIVE. SUIT AG.ST TE
Dn~cToRs
REPRESENTATIVE suits by stockholders have long been recognized as a means of
recovering in behalf of the corporation assets which it, through its directors, has
failed or is unwilling to pursue. The peculiar attributes of such a proceeding are
two-fold. The corporation, having refused to carry on the suit itself, becomes a
defendant in the action to the extent that it is being attacked for its failure to liti-
gate;2 and, secondly, since the plaintiff, as a shareholder, appears only in a repre-
sentative capacity to enforce the rights of his organization, 3 any benefits that may
result from the litigation accrue directly to the corporation.4 Nevertheless, in this
latter phase of the suit, the corporation is also a necessary party defendant5 for
the procedural reason that service upon it is necessary in order that any judgment
rendered will be binding upon the corporation and the real defendants to avoid sub-
quent suit 5 on the same cause of action.0 Hence, both the real defendants and the
nominally defending corporation must be properly served with process before any
redress may be had in the representative action.7 That the necessities of complying
with this procedure may produce awkward and, perhaps, inequitable results is illus-
trated by a recent New York decision. Certain stockholders brought a representa-
tive suit against some of the directors of a corporation for misappropriation of its
property. The defendants were residents of New York, where they were served; the
corporation was domiciled in Ohio and did no business in New York, nor was it
otherwise subject to service there.8 Because of noncompliance with the general
rule of joinder, requiring all parties defendant to be subject to the jurisdiction of
1. Denman v. Richardson, 284 Fed. 592 (W. D. Wash. 1921); Jones v. Johnson, 10
Bush 649 (Ky. 1874); Brinkerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52 (1882); Kavanaugh v. Com-
monwealth Trust Co., 181 N. Y. 121, 73 N. E. 562 (1905); 3 Coon, ConronATI0.ns (8th ed.
1923) § 701; 3 Poaro, EQuITY JuR sPRUDmC (4th ed. 1918) § 1095; Glenn, Tihe Stock-
holders' Suit-Corporate and Individual Grkeances (1924) 33 YA=., L. 3. 520.
2. BALANin=, MLA uAL or Co RoATxo LAW Am PRACTICE (1930) § 186; sze Note
(1934) 43 Yr=n L. J. 661.
3. Converse v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 209 Mass. 539, 9S N. E. 929 (1911); Alex-
ander v. Donahoe, 143 N. Y. 203, 38 N. E. 263; and references, supra note 1.
4. Landis v. Sea Isle City Hotel Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 654, 33 At. 964 (1896); 3 Coon,
CoapoRAnoxs (8th ed. 1923) § 701.
5. Denman v. Richardson, 284 Fed. 592 (W. D. Wash. 1921); Converne v. United Shea
Machinery Co., 209 Mass. 539, 95 N. E. 929 (1911); Barry v. Moeller, 63 N. J. Eq. 4S3,
59 Atl. 97 (1904); Brinkerhoff v. Bostwick, 8S N. Y. 52 (1882); 13 FrxTc:m, Co.n0ra-
TioNs (1932) § 5997.
6. Hyams v. Old Dominion Co., 204 Fed. 6S1 (D. Me. 1913); Kidd v. New Hamp hire
Traction Co., 72 N. H. 273, 56 AtL 465 (1903); Kelly v. Thomas, 234 Pa. 419, S3 At. 307
(1912); Note (1934) 43 YAL L. J. 661.
7. Eldred v. American Palace-Car Co., 105 Fed. 457 (C. C. A. 3d, 19D9); Reed v. Hol-
lingsworth, 157 Iowa 94, 135 N. W. 37 (1912); Kelly v. Thomas, 234 Pa. 419, S3 At. 307
(1912); 3 Coon, CoapORATIozs (8th ed. 1923) § 733.
8. For the legal basis of jurisdiction over corporations see 2 Cr. , Rrcmans (2d. ed.
1929) § 7567; GOODRacH, Conm'cr or LAws (1927) §§ 77, 78; RmT,%TAxTE , Co:,-Lu oz
LAWS (1934) §§ 87-93.
1091
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the court where suit is brought, the stockholders' complaint was dismissed. As
was pointed out in a dissenting opinion, the effect of the decision is to permit the
defendant directors to remain outside of the jurisdiction where service on the cor-
poration is possible; and through their control over the organization, it is possible
for them to prevent its voluntary appearance in the state where they themselves
could be served. Thus their past conduct, which is the subject of the litigation, can-
not be impeached, and their present activities in continuing as directors of a cor-
poration which is seeking redress against them remain inviolate, at least under
the procedure here resorted to.
The inequities of such a situation are clearly posed in view of the fact that the
corporation should actually be regarded as the plaintiff in the representative action, 10
since the wrong complained of is viewed as being a violation of the corporation's
rights, and since the plaintiff shareholder is considered as suing only in behalf of
the corporation. Many courts have recognized this fact in refusing to the corpora-
tion in a representative suit the ordinary incidental rights attending real parties
defendant, such as the right to appeal from an adverse judgment,11 and to submit
affirmative defenses.' 2 Consequently, it seems to follow that, although technically a
defendant, the corporation should not be heard to object to the court's jurisdiction
on the ground of a non-joinder with the defendant directors, since no deprivation of
its rights can result from a judgment in the stockholder's suit. For if the complaint
of the shareholder prevails, the corporation will receive the benefits of the judgment;
and if the suit fails, the plaintiff stockholder, and not the corporation, will bear the
burden of costs of the litigation. Yet, despite this seemingly more logical and justi-
fiable view of the status of the corporation in the representative suit, the overwhelm.
ing weight of authority seems to foster the application of the jurisdictional formali-
ties required in the present case.
If service in the state of suit on both the directors and the corporation be regarded
as essential in this situation, then certain alternatives suggest themselves as methods
of obtaining relief. Conceivably, the stockholder might seek at the corporation's
domicile, where jurisdiction could be acquired over it, the appointment of a receiver
to prevent the loss of the corporate asset,la namely, the cause of action against
the directors. But since this property, preservation of which is sought, is situated
only in the foreign jurisdiction where service on the directors is possible, it would
be necessary to secure in addition an ancillary receiver in that foreign jurisdiction
9. Freeman v. Bean, 276 N. Y. Supp. 310 (App. Div., 1st Dep't, 1935), two Judges
dissenting.
10. Willoughby v. Chicago Junction Ry. Co. & Union Stockyards Co., 50 N. J. Eq.
656, 25 Atl. 277 (1892); Wilson v. American Palace-Car Co., 66 N. J. Eq. 539, 54 AtI.
415 (1903); Herrick v. Dempster, 73 N. J. Eq. 145, 75 At]. 810 (1907); Holmes v. Camp,
180 App. Div. 409, 167 N. Y. Supp. 840 (1st Dep't, 1917). The English practice, taking a
more realistic view of the situation, joins the corporation as a party plaintiff. Duckett v.
Grover [1877] 6 Ch. D. 82.
11. Kaiser v. Neimeyer, 198 Wis. 581, 225 N. W. 188 (1929) (taxpayers' representative
suit on behalf of a municipality). Contra: Sheridan v. Sheridan Light Co. of N. Y., 38
Hun. 396 (N. Y. 1st Dep't, 1886).
12. See Note (1934) 43 YALF L. J. 661; cf. McHarg v. Commonwealth Finance Corp.,
44 S. D. 144, 182 N. W. 705 (1921).
13. 2 CrLaix, REcm vis (2d ed. 1929) § 757. For a case that seems to sanction this type
of procedure, although the asset was situated in the corporation's domiciliary state, see
Satterthwaite, ex re]. Irving Trust Co. v. Eastern Bankers' Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 310, 154 Ati.
475 (1931).
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to prosecute the claim,14 since the authority of the domiciliary receiver does not
usually extend beyond the borders of the state wherein he is appointed.' 5 However,
practical considerations render this procedure inadvisable and probably impossible.
For the normally impecunious minority shareholder will probably not have sufficient
funds available to pursue this circuitous mode of relief. And, moreover, the steps
involved in its application would seem to call for a multiple determination of issues
of fact proving the cause of action against the directors, first, when the appointment
of the domiciliary receiver is sought, in order that the court may find that there is
actually a cause of action of benefit to the corporation; perhaps again on the appli-
cation for an ancillary receiver; and at still another time when the ancillary receiver
appears to press the suit in behalf of the corporation in the actual trial where the
directors have been served. In addition, in view of the traditional reluctance of
courts to appoint receivers when other means of relief are available, 10 it seems some-
what improbable that the application of the stockholder would be granted.
Such other remedy does exist in the form of a mandatory injunction which might
be granted by the court at the corporation's domicile, ordering it to enter an appear-
ance in the foreign suit against the directors, so as to satisfy the procedural require-
ment of joinder. Ample authority exists for this type of mandatory injunction re-
quiring of a defendant affirmative action in another state, 17 or affirmative action
within the jurisdiction rendering a decree which affects property situated outside the
state.' 8 Thus a defendant has been ordered to ship property from one foreign juris-
diction to another so as to prevent the complainant from sustaining irreparable in-
jury;' 9 and several cases have upheld the mandate of a court of equity directing a
conveyance of land whose situs was outside the state of suit.20 The similarity to
these situations of the stockholder's prayer to force the corporation to submit to
service elsewhere, either by appearing in the foreign suit or by sending a registered
letter consenting to jurisdiction, seems apparent. Nor does the traditional argument,
which has characterized opposition to granting a mandatory injunction, ordering
affirmative action in a foreign jurisdiction,2 ' seem applicable to the principal situa-
tion. This argument has been that, since the defendant may be ordered by the court
of one state to do an act forbidden by the courts of the jurisdiction where the act
14. 1 CLmx, RmEmwRs (2d ed. 1929) § 608. The court of the foreign jurisdiction,
where the action against the directors is pending, may broaden the powers of the domicili-
ary receiver by granting him the prerogative of an ancillary receiver.
15. Id. at §§ 318, 608.
16. Massoth v. Central Bus Corp., 104 Conn. 683, 134 At. 236 (1926); Miller v.
Albertina Realty Co., 198 App. Div. 340, 190 N. Y. Supp. 407 (1st Dep't, 1921); 2 Cr.Anr,
REcuvims (2d ed. 1929) §§ 747(a), 748(c).
17. RESTATEENY-T, CONFiCT OF LAws (1934) § 95. illustrations 1 and 2 seem to be
analogous to the situation under discussion.
18. GooDRIcH, Comarcr OF LAWS (1927) § 79.
19. Madden v. Rosseter, 114 Misc. 416, 187 N. Y. Supp. 462 (1921) (the prayer for in-
junction was granted in New York appointing a receiver to proceed to California, obtain
the property, and ship it to Kentucky). See Note (1921) 30 Y=Itz L. J. 865, discsusng
the recent trend of courts to expand the extra-territorial purview of the mandatory injunc-
tion.
20. Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148 (U. S. 1810); GooDiciH, Co:N.-mcr or L ws (1927)
§ 79. The defendant, who conveys by deed in the state where the decree is rendered,
cannot impeach the validity of the conveyance at the situs of the land by claiming that
it was conveyed under duress and fear of imprisonment for contempt. Gilliland v. Inabit, 92
Iowa 46, 60 N. W. 211 (1894); Steele v. Bryant, 132 Ky. 569, 116 S. W. 755 (1939).
21. Beale, The Jurisdicion of Courts Over Foreigners (1913) 26 HtMv. L. REv. 283, 292.
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is to be performed, his unfortunate dilemma, created by the threat of contempt pro.
ceedings in the court issuing the injunction and by the reluctance of the second
court to give the full faith and credit to this equitable decree which would be given
to an ordinary judgment,22 will be solved by a refusal to grant the injunction. But
this difficulty would be unlikely to arise in a situation such as that involved in the
present case; for the only basis for a refusal by the court, where the action is pend-
ing against the directors, to grant full faith and credit to the injunction decree by
accepting the corporation's submission to its jurisdiction, would be the traditional
hostility of courts to interfere with the internal operation of a foreign corporation.2 3
But in many cases involving a stockholder's representative suit no such hostility has
been manifested, and interference has been countenanced because of the helpless
situation of the stockholder which would result if relief were denied, and because
of the analogy existing between the position of the shareholder and that of the cor-
poration in whose behalf he is suing. Since the corporation would not be denied
access to the courts of a foreign state were it pursuing the delinquent directors, the
stockholder in the representative suit has been allowed to avail himself of the same
privilege.24 However, in this type of action against the corporation also, as is true
in the application for a receiver by the representative stockholder, the expense in-
volved in seeking the injunction from the foreign court would seem to be a major
deterrent to the instigation of the suit. Moreover, another dual exposition of the
issues of fact would be necessitated, since the court hearing the application for the
mandatory injunction would require sufficient proof of the misfeasance of the direc-
tors to warrant issuing the injunction; and even after securing the appearance of the
corporation in the jurisdiction where the directors were being prosecuted, the actual
trial would involve a new finding as to these violations of duty.
A more readily exercisable course of procedure, which would obviate the necessity
of following the expensive and circuitous methods suggested, might be available
in the state where service can be made upon the defendant directors. Since the
alleged misfeasance of the directors constitutes a wrong against the corporation, the
resulting cause of action against these officers is in the nature of a corporate asset.
22. See GoonRicH, CoNfcTr or LAWS (1927) § 207.
23. North State Copper and Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 20 AtI. 1039 (1885);
Kimball v. St. Louis and S. F. Ry. Co., 157 Mass. 7, 31 N. E. 697 (1892); Morris v.
Stevens, 6 Phila. 488 (Pa. 1868); Madden v. Penn Electric Light Co., 181 Pa. 617, 37 At.
817 (1897); Kelly v. Thomas, 234 Pa. 419, 83 AtI. 307 (1912); BEALE, FoaoxN CoRPoRA-
TIONS (1904) § 309. The reasons underlying this reluctance have been that, there being
no property of the foreign corporation within the state whose legal incidents might be
determined in an adjudication binding upon it, some mistakes in the interpretation of the
law of the corporation's domicile might be involved which would be discovered In a sub-
sequent proceeding to enforce the judgment at the domicile; or, that the stockholders,
having voluntarily become affiliated with a foreign corporation, are not entitled to pro-
tection by the courts of the state of suit against the consequences of their own act.
24. Voorhees v. Mason, 245 11. 256, 91 N. E. 1056 (1910); Deeming v. Beatty Oi Co,,
72 Kan. 614, 84 Pac. 385 (1906); Sloan v. Clarkson, 105 Md. 17, 66 Atl. 18 (1907); Rich-
ardson v. Clinton Wall Trunk Mfg. Co., 131 Mass. 580, 64 N. E. 400 (1902); Ernst v.
Rutherford and Boiling Springs Gas Co., 38 App. Div. 388, 56 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dep't,
1899). Another argument against the granting of such a mandatory injunction has been
the probable difficulty of enforcement, since the defendant might leave the jurisdiction
before complying with the order. This objection, also, would seem inapplicable to the pro.
cedure under discussion, since the corporation does not have the mobility of the individual
who might absent himself from the jurisdiction of the court which rendered the decree,
before contempt proceedings could be instituted for nonconformance with the mandate.
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It exists in the state where the directors have been served and actually is property
of the foreign corporation. The situation seems analogous to the usual procedure of
garnishment, where the principal debtor, although not personally served, is bound
by the judgment in the garnishment action.es For, in the present case, the corpora-
tion may be analogized to the principal debtor, whose "debt" may be regarded as the
breach of its duty to the representative stockholder of pressing the litigation against
the directors;2 the status of the representative shareholders, in turn, is similar to
that of the garnishor, whose right to have the corporation prosecute the suit has
been violated; 2 and the defendant directors are in the position of garnishees who
hold a corporate asset in the property they have allegedly misappropriated. Hence,
it would seem to follow that through the machinery of attachment20 usually utilized
in proceedings in ren 2 7 the corporation, even though an absentee defendant, might
be bound by a judgment thus entered, insofar as that judgment pertains to its prop-
erty within the state, namely the cause of action.P Service of notice to the cor-
poration at its domicile would give it ample opportunity to appear if it so desired,
and would satisfy the requirements of due process.9 And the binding nature of the
decree upon the corporation would free the defendant directors from subsequent
suits on the same cause of action.
PECULIAR AvAn-ArrY Or LAxD FOR A DAm SrrE As AN ELnnNT O1?
COMPENSATION 3N CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
JUDICiAL opinions often state that "just compensation" for property seized under
the sovereign power of eminent domain is to be determined by an appraisal of "fair
market value."1  As applied to condemnation of most real estate, for which there
25. Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215 (1905).
26. Choses in action are property subject to attachment and garnishmenL Cx. Coinz
Cirv. PRoc. (Deering, 1931) § 6S8; IOWA CODE (1931) § 11672; L. CODE PnAc. (Dart, 1932)
§ 647; ALTss. G=T. LAws (1932) c. 214 § 3(7); Moirr. Rav. CODE Ana. (Choate, 1921)
§ 9424; WAs. REv. STAT. AwN. (Remington, 1932) § 518. And they are subject to cred-
itors' levy. Delval v. Gagnon, 213 Mass. 203, 99 N. E. 1095 (1912); German Nat. Bank
v. First Nat. Bank, 55 Neb. 86, 75 N. W. 531 (1898); Hudson v. Pletz, 11 Paige 120 (N. Y.
Ch. 1844); City of Cincinnati v. Hafer, 49 Ohio St. 60, 30 N. E. 197 (1892).
27. This method has been resorted to by representative stockholders when there were
actual tangible assets within the jurisdiction where the directors could be sued. Watts v.
Alexander, Morrison & Co., 34 F. (2d) 66 (E. D. N. Y. 1929); Grant v. Cananea Con-
solidated Copper Co., 189 N. Y. 241, 82 N. E. 191 (1907); Grant v. Cobre Grande Coppar
Co., 193 X. Y. 306, 86 N. E. 34 (1903); Holmes v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 359, 114 N. E. E41
(1916).
28. This argument is made by way of dictum in at least one case. Kidd v. New Hamp-
shire Traction Co., 72 N. H. 273, 56 At. 465 (1903). A similar acquisition of jurizzdic-
tion may be found in the situation where an outstanding note is attached by the payee's
creditor, subjecting the payee to the jurisdiction of the court where the maker of the note
has been served. Note (1928) 27 Acn. L. Rav. 207.
29. GoODnzc, CohrIFcr or LAws (1927) §§ 66-69.
1. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 305 (1923); Jacob3 v.
United States, 290 U. S. 13, 17 (1933); Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion of Pennsylvania, 291 U. S. 227, 238 (1934); Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 245
(1934); Lambert v. Griffin, 257 Ill. 152, 100 N. E. 495 (1912). The price paid by the
owner is not determinative, since he may have purchased at a bad bargain. L. Vogehtein
& Co., Inc. v. United States, 262 U. S. 337, 340 (1923).
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is no constant and active market, "fair market value" is an almost wholly illusory
term, since the peculiar needs of both vendor and purchaser, and their respective
bargaining abilities, are important factors in determining a sale price.2  But these
factors may not be considered in condemnation proceedings fixing "just compensa-
tion," because they cannot be accurately measured in terms of money.3 Instead,
various other tests have been invoked, such as the quality and improvements on
the land, which make the property itself economically valuable in the hands of any
potential, hypothetical owner or purchaser able to develop all its resources. 4 And
the valuation is determined in accordance with the general conditions of the real
estate market in the vicinity.5 Since many elements are necessarily considered in
fixing the resulting price, which is supposed to represent that amount which some
abstract buyer intending to develop all resources of the property would pay, con-
demnation proceedings necessarily create many serious problems in the determination
of an award.
An oft recurring question of valuation has arisen in connection with a recent case
involving condemnation of land for the Norris Dam by the Tennessee Valley
Authority.6 This land, estimated as constituting approximately 100,000 acres, in-
cludes railroads, public schools, churches, cemeteries, state highways, bridges and
complete towns so that condemnation proceedings are inevitable to supplement ac-
quisitions made through ordinary purchase.7 Some of the land is adjacent to a
river to be used in creating the dam, and its owners, who claim title to the land up
to the middle of the stream, have urged that they are entitled to additional com-
pensation because of the particular suitability of their property for dam purposes.
Their theory is that just compensation should include all the inherent economic values
of the property which might affect market price. Since the value of the site for
dam purposes has long been known, and since private interests have expressed an
intention of building such a dan, the market value of the property has been corres-
pondingly increased, so that the factor of peculiar availability is to be considered in
fixing an award. These arguments, although not in accord with the usual holdings,
2. HAi'soN, CoNDEwxANnTo APPRAIsAL. PROCEDURE (1934) 63-75. However, when a
government requisitions such things as coal or other products which have a relatively con-
stant market value, only that value is properly considered. United States v. New River
Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341 (1923).
3. 1 NIcHoLs, EMTNr DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) §§ 217, 218.
4. Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 255 (1934). The mere mode of occupation
by the present owner does not limit the extent of the owner's recovery. Boom Co. v.
Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 408 (1878); Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co. v. Barber Asphalt
Paving Co., 197 U. S. 430, 435 (1905); Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston,
217 U. S. 189, 195 (1910). Remote and speculative uses of the land are not considered In
determining value. Pa. S. V. Rr. Co. v. Cleary, 125 Pa. 442, 17 AtI. 468 (1889). Nor are
the peculiar plans of the condemnee. Holyhood Cemetery Ass'n v. Inhabitants of Brook-
line, 215 Mass. 255, 102 N. E. 340 (1913).
5. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 408 (1878); Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United
States, 265 U. S. 106 (1924) (seizure of ships by the government); East St. Louis C. & W,
Ry. v. Illinois Sfate Trust Co., 248 Ill. 559, 94 N. E. 149 (1911).
6. United States v. Longmire; Same v. Hawkins, Report of Commission in United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee (1935).
7. The land to be acquired is owned by between 5000 and 7500 different persons. To
make the project financially successful it will be necessary to build a number of other dams,
so that the entire scheme is of even greater proportions. See brief for the government
before the commission, pp. 48-50.
have been accepted in the report of the commissioners to the federal district court
as the basis for granting a larger award. 8
The unfortunate result reached by the commissioners may be explained by reference
to the confused analyses and incautious dicta of certain past decisions. In Boom
Co. v. Patterson,9 an early Supreme Court decision, property peculiarly adapted for
use as a log boom was condemned for that purpose, and the Court held such adapta-
bility was properly included in the appraisal value. Since the property condemned
in that case could have been employed as a boom by any individual, and since this
fact would therefore be considered as an element of value by any purchaser at a
private sale, it was properly reckoned as one item in the determination of fair market
value.' 0 But some subsequent state decisions have ignored the facts to which this rule
in favor of added compensation had been applied, and accepted the case as authority
for the broader view that compensation must be granted for any peculiar adaptability
of a site in all cases, regardless of whether such use could be effected by private
purchasers, not clothed with the power of eminent domain.'1
Legal writers and most courts, having regard for the principles of proper appraisal,
have, however, limited the application of the holding in the Boom case to situations
in which the owner of land, or parties purchasing from him at a private sale, and
having no power of eminent domain, could reasonably be expected to make use of
the peculiar availability of the land by developing it in the same manner as that
intended by the condemnor12 Thus construed, the decision is justifiable since the
ability of a purchaser to develop the special adaptabilities of the land might well
increase the price such a purchaser would offer for the land.13 Similarly, if a num-
ber of land parcels are necessary to carry 'out the plan, the same principles as to
compensation for peculiar availability should obtain; that is, added compensation
should only be granted if an individual or corporation, acting solely through the
medium of private purchase, could successfully combine the several integral tracts
into one unit.14 But if the potential use of the land can only be realized by resort-
8. The commissioners filed their report in the federal district court. Either side my
appeal within 20 days. If such appeal is taken, a trial de novo will be held before three
federal district judges, under the TVA Act, 48 STAT. 70 (1933), 16 U. S. C. A. § 831x
(1934).
9. 98 U. S. 403 (1878). The decision is authority in all federal condemnation proceed-
ings and in all state proceedings in which the 14th Amendment has been invoked; it has baean
followed in innumerable decisions, both state and federal, some of which are cited in Olson v.
United States, 292 U. S. 246, 259 (1934).
10. The Boom case, in fact, recognized as a standard of fair market value the suitability
of the property "having regard to existing business or wants of the community or such as
may be expected in the immediate future." 98 U. S. 403, 403 (1378).
11. Webster v. Kansas City & S. Ry. Co., 116 Mo. 114, 22 S. W. 474 (1893); Alloway
v. City of Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510, 13 S. W. 128 (1890); cf. Little Rock junction Ry. Co.
v. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381, 5 S. W. 792 (1837); Brown v. Forest Water Co, 213 Pa. 440,
62 AUt. 1078 (1906).
12. Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246 (1934); City of Ely v. Conan, 91 Blnn. 127,
97 N. W. 737 (1903).
13. Ford Hydro-Electric Co. v. Neely, 13 F. (2d) 361 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926); Union
Electric Light and Power Co. v. Snyder Estate Co., 65 F. (2d) 297, 304 (C. C. A. .th,
1933); see New York v. Sage, 239 U. S. 57, 61 (1915); Olson v. United States, 292 U. S.
246, 255, 256 (1934).
14. Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246 (1934); Medina Valley Irrigation Co. v.
Seekatz, 237 Fed. 805 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916); Emmons v. Utilities Power Co, 83 N. H. 131,
141 Atl. 65 (1928). The fact that the several tracts may be acquired by eminent domain
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ing to condemnation proceedings in order to acquire the large number of separately
owned tracts, it is obvious that a private purchaser would not pay for the land's
peculiar availability, and consequently the owner should not be entitled to receive
added compensation from the condemnor.15 This view has been accepted by the
Supreme Court 16 and many state courts,17 since to hold otherwise, as a few juris-
dictions have done,18 would be to defeat one of the principal purposes of condem-
nation proceedings, which is to permit the condemnor to acquire property without
paying for an increase in valuation resulting solely from the fact that the condemnor
contemplates improvements.1 9
The sites required by the Tennessee Valley Authority, all of which are necessary
to build a commercially successful dam, could not be acquired without condemnation
proceedings because they include so many parcels of land, held by different
owners. 7 It therefore follows from the decisions of the Supreme Court that the
government should not in the instant case be required to pay for the peculiar adapta-
proceedings does not of itself negate consideration of the particular availability for the
purposes intended by the condemnors, since it is possible that a purchaser might also be
able to unite the tracts, and the market price would be affected thereby. City of New
York v. Sage, 239 U. S. 57 (1915).
15. Dicta in In re Ashokan Dam, 190 Fed. 413 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1917) indicate that,
if two communities might acquire land by outright purchase for reservoir purposes, peculiar
adaptability for such a use may be considered in condemnation proceedings. But there
can be no doubt that such an interpretation is contrary to the present status of the federal
law. City of New York v. Sage, 230 Fed. -932 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
16. McGovern v. City of New York, 229 U. S. 363 (1913); City of New York v.
Sage, 239 U. S. 57 (1915); Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246 (1934). Some of the
language and the ruling in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S.
53, 77 (1913), might seem to suggest a contrary result, but such a doubt must be dispelled
in view of the interpretation given the decision by the court in McGovern v. City of New
York, supra, which clearly outlines the principle noted above.
17. City of Stockton v. Ellingwood, 96 Cal. App. 708, 275 Pac. 228 (1929); City of
Pasadena v. Union Trust Co. of San Francisco, 138 Cal. App. 21, 31 P. (2d) 433 (1934);
Emmons v. Utilities Power Co., 83 N. H. 181, 141 AtI. 65 (1928); 1 NicnoLs, op. Cit. supra
note 3, § 220; 2 LEwis, EMnT DoAn; (3d ed. 1909) § 707, does not analyze the prob-
lem very clearly. The English courts are in agreement with this position. In re An Arbi-
tration between Gough and the Aspatia, Silloth and District Joint Water Board, [1904J
1 K. B. 417; Sidney v. North Eastern Ry. Co., E1914] 3 K. B. 29, 640.
18. Young v. Harrison, 17 Ga. 30 (1855); Johnson v. Freeport and Mississippi River
Ry. Co., 111 MI1. 413 (1884); cf. Brown v. Forest Water Co., 213 Pa. 440, 62 Atl. 1078
(1906); see In re New York, W. & B. Ry. Co., 151 App. Div. 50, 135 N. Y. Supp. 234
(2d Dept, 1912); see note 11, supra.
19. The opposite result would allow the condemnee a sum almost equal to the value
of the land to the taker, which is contrary to a well settled principle of condemnation.
Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 256 (1934); Union Eectric Light and Power Co. v,
Snyder Estate Co., 65 F. (2d) 297, 304 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933); Lambert v. Griffin, 257 11.
152, 100 N. E. 496 (1912). Similarly, the condemnee is not entitled to have his land ap-
praised according to the value of neighboring land which has increased because of the In-
tended improvement. Kerr v. South Park Commissioners, 117 U. S. 379 (1886); United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 76 (1913) ; Clark's Ferry Bridge
Co. v. Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania, 291 U. S. 227, 238 (1934). The theory
of just compensation generally is that an owner must not be required to suffer any pecuniary
loss, and that he is to be put into the same financial position as of the time of the taking.
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 304 (1923).
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bility of any land for dam purposes. Nor should the fact that the land's value as a
dam site was previously known affect this conclusion, as the commission believed it
should. Such notoriety is important only when some possible purchaser might
pay an increased price because he intends to build a dam; 2 ' since no private pur-
chaser could possibly have built the dam here proposed, because of the extent of the
particular improvement involved, knowledge of the land's suitability is irrelevant
and should not have been considered. Moreover, regardless of any technical analysis,
the decision is undesirable from a practical standpoint, because it compels the gov-
ernment to pay a larger price representing the value of the property to it as con-
demnor, rather than that price, traditionally accepted as the measure of just compen-
sation, which merely places the condemnee in as good a financial position as before
the taking of his property.' 9
CONDIrrIoNs AND LIxr'TATIONS IN LEAsING CONTRACTS
WHLE the insolvency or bankruptcy of a lessee constitutes an anticipitory breach
of his duty to pay rent,1 nevertheless, unless there is some specific provision in the
lease to the contrary, the lessor cannot prevent the lessee from retaining possession
of the premises until the lessor dislodges him by a possibly prolonged and expensive
action to dispossess. At the same time, the lessee, even though discharged in bank-
ruptcy as to other debts, continues under a duty to pay the rents until the end of
the lease term, unless he is dispossessed, 2 or unless his trustee in bankruptcy elects
to accept the lease. For claims for future rents are not ordinarily so fixed and liquid-
ated at the time of the filing of the petition as to be provable in bankruptcy by the
lessors However, since the continued duty of an insolvent or bankrupt lessee to
20. The Illinois courts have held, however, that if there is an increase in the general
property value due to the proposed seizure, the condemnee is entitled to a higher award.
Concordia Cemetery Association v. Minnesota & N. W. Rr. Co, 121 III 199, 12 N. E.
536 (1887); Sanitary District of Chicago v. Loughran, 160 IlR. 362, 43 N. E. 359 (1896);
see also Sunday v. Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 62 Fla. 395, 57 So. 351 (1912); Gate City Ter-
minal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456, 71 S. E. 903 (1911). If the property proposed for con-
demnation is originally expected to include the land of the condemnee, any rise in price
due to the improvement will not be included under the rule adopted'in Massachumetts.
However, if the land is not originally included but is subsequently taken, an interim riaz
in price is considered in making the appraisal. Bowditch v. City of Boston, 164 Ma.
107, 41 N. E. 132 (1895).
21. City of New York v. Sage, 239 U. S. 57 (1915); Smith v. Commonwealth, 210 Ma..
259, 96 N. E. 666 (1911); Note (1916) 29 H.%Rv. L. REV. 427.
1. See summary of cases in Comment (1929) 5 Izm. L. J. 126. Although these cas
refer specifically to bankruptcy, the same principle is applicable to insolvency, since in-
solvency usually disables the promisor from performance.
2. Even here the lessee may continue liable if the leasing agreement contains a provi-
sion reserving to the lessor his claim against the lessee for rents accruing subrequent to
such dispossession. Cf. note 18, infra.
3. Watson v. Merrill, 136 F. 359, 363 (C. C. A. 3d, 1905); In re Frazin, 183 F. 28 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1910); In re Mullings Clothing Co., 252 F. 667 (D. Conn. 1918); In re Mile.
Lemaud, Inc., 13 F. (2d) 208 (D. Mass. 1926), aftd, sub. nom. Petition of Colburn, 16 F.
(2d) 780 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926); Shapiro v. Thompson, 160 Ala. 363, 49 So. 391 (1939);
Mayer v. Clarke, 129 Ill. App. 424 (1906); Kirstein Holding Co. v. Bangor Veritas, Inc.,
131 Me. 421, 163 Atl. 655 (1933); L. K. Liggett Co., 224 Mlan. 456, 113 N. E. 184 (1916);
see discussion in N. Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1933, sections 10 and 11, at 9, col. 1. It is other-
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pay rent may prove practically worthless to the lessor,4 provisions are commonly in-
serted in leases to the effect that the occurrence of insolvency or bankruptcy of the
lessee shall give the lessor a power to declare the lease forthwith terminated and to
re-enter immediately.5 At times the contract contains simply the statement that
"the bankruptcy or insolvency of the party of the second part during the term afore-
said will immediately terminate this lease upon the happening thereof."0  Or it may
contain an additional statement that, in the event of the breach of any of the con-
ditions in the lease, the lessor shall have a right to declare the lease terminated and
to re-enter.7 Ambiguity in the latter two types of clauses in leasing contracts has
given rise to an increasing amount of litigation. The question is whether the clauses
should be construed as making the bankruptcy or insolvency of itself terminate the
landlord-tenant relationship, thus averting any further liability of the lessee for
future rents; or whether it should be regarded as a "condition subsequent," giving
the lessor merely a power to declare the leasehold estate terminated, thus enabling
the lessor to claim against the lessee for the payment of rents up to the time the
lessor exercises his power.8
In a recent Missouri case, a landlord sued the president of the bankrupt lessee
corporation as guarantor of a lease which provided that "the bankruptcy or insol-
vency of the party of the second part during the term . . . will immediately termi-
wise, however, where the lessor is able, by virtue of a special clause in the lease, to prove
his claims in bankruptcy for the discounted value of future rents, less discounted fair re-
rental value of the premises for the remainder of the term. See Note (1935) 44 Y^AL L. J.
670.
4. See discussion in In re Mile. Lemaud, Inc., 13 F. (2d) 208, 209 (D. Mass, 1926).
This is particularly true in the case of corporate lessees. N. Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1933, at 36,
col. 8; id., June 10, 1934, §§ 10 and 11, at 1, col. 7.
5. Galbraith v. Wood, 124 Minn. 210, 144 N. W. 945 (1914); cf. Martin v. Crossley, 46
Misc. 254, 91 N. Y. Supp. 712 (App. T. 1905); Janes v. Paddell, 67 Misc. 420, 122 N. Y.
Supp. 760 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Koss v. United Stores Realty Corp., 147 Misc. 44, 263 N. Y.
Supp. 474 (1st Dep't, 1933); see L. K. Liggett Co. v. Wilson, 224 Mass. 456, 113 N. E
184 (1916). However, due to the fact that in practice the lessor often after re-entry sus-
tains the loss of having to lease the premises at a lower figure, there is an increasing tendency
to insert in addition a clause reserving a claim against the lessee up to the end of the lease
term for rental lbsses occasioned by the lessee's breach. See In re Outfitters' Operating
Realty Co., 69 F. (2d) 90, 91 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), aff'd, sub. nom. Irving Trust Co. v.
Perry, 55 Sup. Ct. 150 (1934), noted in (1935) 44 YAuL L. J. 670. The latter type of pro-
vision is not here treated.
6. Pomeroy v. Strauss, 75 S. W. (2d) 868 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1934); cf. Cohen v. Afro-
American Realty Co., 58 Misc. 199, 108 N. Y. Supp. 998 (App. T. 1908).
7. Schneider v. Springmann, 25 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928); In re Cellan, 41 F,
(2d) 560 (E. D. Pa. 1930); Murray Realty Co. v. Regal Shoe Co., 265 N. Y. 332, 193 N,
E. 164 (1934); cf. Judd. v. Mutual Bank and Trust Co., 114 Conn. 553, 159 Atl. 48Y (1932).
8. The effect of such clauses on the power of the lessor to bring summary proceedings
for repossession, as under N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT, § 1410 (1), is not treated here. For analy-
sis of the question, see Burnee Corp. v. Uneeda Pure Orange Drink Co., 132 Misc. 43 ,
230 N. Y. Supp. 239 (1st Dep't, 1928); Koss v. United Stores Realty Corp., 147 Misc. 44,
263 N. Y. Supp. 474 (1st Dep't, 1933).
Several recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court as to the provability In
bankruptcy of lessors' claims for rents subsequent to bankruptcy have turned partly upon
the question of whether it is the bankruptcy itself, or the lessor's exercise of power which
terminates the leasehold estate under such clauses. Compare Manhattan Properties v. Irv-
ing Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320 (1934) with Irving Trust Co. v. Perry, 55 Sup. Ct. 150 (1934);
see note 14, infra.
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nate this lease upon the happening thereof." 9 The guarantor contended that the
landlord-tenant relationship, and therefore the lessee's liability for future rents, was
terminated automatically by the insolvency; and that the lessee, and consequently the
guarantor, was not liable for rents accruing during the lessee's occupation of the
premises subsequent to the beginning of insolvency and until the adjudication in
bankruptcy 10 The lessor, however, was allowed to recover on the theory that, since
he had no notice of the insolvency, and therefore no opportunity to protect himself
by proceedings to repossess, the lessee was liable for rents up to the time of adjudi-
cation in bankruptcy, despite the language of the lease. The necessary implication
of this holding is that the fact of insolvency, if coupled with notice to the lessor,
will operate under the lease provision in question as an automatic termination of the
lease. On the facts in the principal case, the lessee, and therefore the guarantor, would
have been liable regardless of whether the clause in question had been construed to
make the insolvency terminate the lease automatically when coupled with notice of
insolvency to the lessor, or whether it had been construed as making the termination
conditional upon the subsequent exercise by the lessor of a power to declare the lease
terminated, since no attempt had been made to exercise such a power. However, in
situations where the lessor has actual notice of the insolvency, or constructive notice
by reason of an adjudication in bankruptcy,12 and nevertheless allows the lessee to
continue in possession, the interpretation adopted by the Missouri court would im-
munize the lessee from liability for rents, at the contract rate, accruing after insolven-
cy, because the lease would be regarded as having been automatically terminated.
The New York Court of Appeals recently came to a similar conclusion 3  Writh-
out consideration of any question of notice, it interpreted a clause in a lease, pro-
viding that an adjudication of the lessee as bankrupt should ipso facto end the lease,
as causing an automatic termination of the leasehold estate upon the occurrence of
the adjudication. It, therefore, denied recovery of any rents accruing after the
adjudication even though the lessee remained in possession. The New York holding
is particularly significant because it was made in spite of an additional clause in the
same lease giving "the lessor at its option" the power to "terminate this agreement
upon the breach of any of its conditions." This clause would seem to imply an
intention of the parties to make the fact of bankruptcy operate as a "condition
subsequent," rather than as an automatic severance of the landlord-tenant relation-
ship.' 4
9. Pomeroy v. Strauss, 75 S. W. (2d) 868 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1934).
10. The court held that the fact that the guarantor was being sued upon the contract
of guaranty, rather than the lessee upon the contract of lease, could neither affect the con-
struction of the lease nor the obligation of the guarantor to fulfill any of the defaulted
obligations of the lessee thereunder. This is the general rule. Spitz v. Nunn, 34 Ohio
App. 397, 171 N. E. 117 (1930).
11. Insolvency was here regarded as being an access of liabilities over assets. Pomeroy
v. Strauss, 75 S. W. (2d) 868, 869 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1934).
12. While the court did not expressly speak of adjudication in bankruptcy as a form
of notice to the lessor, it held that such an event would under the lease clause in question
operate as an automatic termination of the leasehold estate, as would also "the breaLin;
down or suspension of the business carried on by the lessee." Pomeroy v. Strauss, 75 S. W.
(2d) 868, 870 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1934).
13. Murray Realty Co. v. Regal Shoe Co., 265 N. Y. 332, 193 N. E. 164 (1934).
14. To the effect that such an implication is ordinarily to be drawn from these claues:
In re Winfield Manufacturing Co., 137 F. 984 (E. D. Pa. 1905); In re Celian, 41 F. (2d)
560 (E. D. Pa. 1930); Beach v. Nixon, 9 N. Y. 35 (1853); Broadex Realty Corporation v.
Jones, 211 App. Div. 96, 206 N. Y. Supp. 602 (1st Dep't, 1924). Contra: In re Baum and
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The treatment of bankruptcy and insolvency clauses in these two cases as special
limitations on the lease term rather than as conditions, is a departure from the usual
rule adopted in England and practically all of the American states, as well as
hitherto in the New York courts, namely, that such clauses are intended for the bene-
fit of the lessor, that to treat them as special limitations would be to enable the
lessee to profit by his own default in escaping liability for subsequent rents and to
negative the purpose of protecting the lessor, that therefore they must be construed
as intended merely to give the lessor a power at his option to determine the lease
upon the occurrence of bankruptcy or insolvency.15 If this present departure from
previous doctrine is to be explained otherwise than by refined definitions of termin-
ology,' 6 it must be explained on the ground that such clauses in reality are inserted
Rubin, 29 F. (2d) 346 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928), where the court, however, was obviously strain-
ing doctrine to prevent the lessor from establishing a lien for future rents, which would
have absorbed all of the lessee's assets, leaving nothing for the other creditors.
15. 2 TnrTANr, L=D ozu AND Tm;ANT (1912) 1368-9, and cases there cited. Tiffany
points out that this rule of construction is applicable whenever the contingency stipulated
in the lease is one of default by the tenant. The New York cases are: Cohen v. Afro-
American Realty Co., 58 Misc. 199, 108 N. Y. Supp. 998 (App. T. 190); Broadex Realty
Corporation v. Jones, 206 N. Y. Supp. 602, 211 App. Div. 96 (1st Dep't, 1924); see Roch-
mer v. The Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co., 63 N. Y. 160, 167-8 (1875); Born v. Schren-
keisen, 110 N. Y. 55, 59-60 (1888). But cf. Parmelee v. Oswego and Syracuse Rr. Co., 6
N. Y. 74 (1851).
Pound, C. J., relied heavily on the authority of In re Outfitters' Operating Realty Co.,
69 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), discussed in Note (1935) 44 YALE L. 3. 670, in reaching
a result in the principal case contrary to the general rule. However, he failed to note the
difference in purpose of the clauses in the two cases. In the Operating Realty Co. case,
the clause ipso facto terminating the lease upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by
or against the lessee was coupled with another clause which provided that, upon the flung
of the petition, the lessor should have an immediate right to damages for such breach in
an amount equal to the sum of the rents for the remainder of the term, less "the fair rental
value of the premises" for the same period. Hand, J., reasoned in this case that the bank-
rutcy clause, coupled with the provision for damages, was clearly intended to protect the
lessor by automatically terminating the leasehold estate upon the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy and thus giving the lessor an immediately provable claim in bankruptcy for
damages for loss of future rents. Cf. In re Scholtz-Mutual Drug Co., 298 F. 539 (D.
Colo. 1924). For the federal courts had repeatedly held that, if the leasehold estate is not
terminated at the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the determination of damages for
nonpayment of rent must necessarily depend on the future and uncertain ability of the
lessor to recover rent from the lessee or a new lessee, so that the claim would not be so
fixed and liquidated at the time of the filing of the petition as to be provable in bank-
ruptcy by the lessor. See complete discussion in Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust Co.,
291 U. S. 320 (1934). In the Murray Realty case, on the other hand, no provision for liquid-
ated damages was involved. Therefore the protection to the lessor could only be afforded
by construing the clause as giving the lessor an option to determine the lease upon occur-
rence of the breach, meanwhile, however, retaining the right to rents accruing subsequent
to the breach and previous to the notice of exercise of the option.
16. To analyze these clauses in this manner, without reference to their underlying pur
pose, is to employ distinctions analogous to those which the common law drew between a
determinable fee, viz. "to A and his heirs so long as St. Paul's Church shall stand," the fee
in such case being held to determine automatically in the event that the church is destroyed;
and a fee on a condition subsequent, viz. "to A and the heirs of his body, but if Brooklyn
Bridge falls, then back to B (grantor)," which was held to give B a power to determine
the fee by notice and proceedings for re-entry upon the occurrence of the condition. See
TIFFAwy, LANDLoRD AND TENANT (1912) 334-337.
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for the protection of the lessee and not, as supposed in the past, for the protection
of the lessor.
Indeed, a recent Connecticut decision expressly advances the argument that such
clauses, even though, as in the New York case, coupled with a later clause giving
the lessor power to declare the lease terminated upon the breach of lease conditions,
might be intended as protection to the lessee, and might be construed as special
limitations. It was suggested that this followed since the occurrence of insolvency
"would bring to an end the specific purpose for which the premises were leased-
conducting a banking business;" so that "liability thereafter under the lease would
be a profitless burden upon the assignee (for benefit of creditors) and the creditors.!"I
However plausible this argument may be in relation to banks, which must not con-
tinue in business while insolvent, it seems inapplicable to the ordinary corporation
or individual lessee. It is unlikely that the ordinary lessee would wish to provide
for the automatic termination of his leasehold estate in event of insolvency, giving
the lessor summary rights of dispossession at a time when the lessee may still have
hopes of saving his business by means of reorganization, composition, or otherwise.
Furthermore, the fact that in the three principal cases and in the majority of the
reported cases the lessee is a corporation indicates that there would be little motive
for seeking to immunize the lessee from liability for occupancy after bankruptcy.
The corporation, being defunct and judgment-proof at that time, is not likely to
fear liability.' 8 In addition, normal business practice would lead to the conclusion
that such provisions are not inserted at the behest of the lessee, who is more likely
to be anxious at the time of leasing to secure the lowest possible rental rate by
guarantees of his reliability, than to request that loopholes be prepared in advance
to enable him to evade liability in the event of insolvency or bankruptcy. It seems
more logical, therefore, to regard the clauses as having been intended as protection
for the lessor, and to construe them to operate as conditions. Moreover, there
is no reason in these cases for construing the contract strictly against the
lessor on the ground that the law disfavors forfeiture and penalties. For the
lessor is simply attempting to recover the agreed rental for the use and occupa-
tion enjoyed and contracted for by the lessee. 1' Consequently, the lessee should re-
17. Judd v. Mutual Bank and Trust Co., 114 Conn. 553, 5S-59, 159 Ad. 437, 4S3
(1932).
18. The point is illustrated by the recent series of lease-breaking scandals, which led
to the amendment of the bankruptcy laws in June, 1934, allowing lessors to prove future
rents in bankruptcy to the extent of one year out of the remaining lease term. In order to
avoid unprofitable leases, certain corporations, particularly the chain stores, had been going
through the formality of bankruptcy, after which the management would organize a net;
corporation to buy up the assets of the old, leaving the lesor a useless claim for future
rents against the defunct corporation. See N. Y. Times, January 6, 1933, at 36, col. S;
id. June 10, 1934, sections 10 and 11, at 1, col. 7. For full discusson, see Note (1935) 44
YAlE L. J. 670.
19. We are not concerned here with leases which reserve to the lessor a right to all
future rents, or a right to the deficiency between the contract rate and the rent obtainble
from new tenants after the lessor has exercised his option of re-entry and terminated the
lessee's estate, under which circumstances some courts have made use of highly artificial
reasoning in order to avoid what was thought to be a penalty or forfeiture in favor of the
lessor. See, for example, Lamson Consolidated Store Service Co. v. Bowland, 114 F. 639
(C. C. A. 6th, 1902); L. K. Liggett Co. v. Wilson, 224 Mass. 456, 113 N. E. 14 (1916).
Even in such cases, however, the more recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
at least, no longer presume against the lessor on grounds of forfeiture or pmnalty. In re
Outfitters' Operating Realty Co., 69 F. (2d) 90, 92 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
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main liable for rents accruing subsequent to his insolvency or bankruptcy, in the
absence of the lessor's exercise of his power to declare the lease terminated. But
even if the lease clauses under consideration be construed as special limitations on
the term, thus destroying any express contract claims of the lessor for rents subse-
quent to bankruptcy or insolvency, it would seem that the lessor should be allowed
recovery under quasi-contractual doctrines for the fair value of the use and occupa-
tion enjoyed by the bankrupt or insolvent lessee who continues to occupy the prem-
ises.20
TAXATION OF INCOME ARISING FROM TRUST IN LIEU OF ALIMONY PAYMENTS
A HUSBAND entered into an agreement with his wife whereby she undertook to
secure a divorce in France, and he bound himself, on the granting of the decree,
to create a trust fund, the income of which, stipulated to be $30,000 annually, was
to be paid to the wife for life in lieu of any claim for alimony. The wife secured
the decree of divorce which, due to the prior understanding, omitted any reference
to alimony; and the husband thereupon established the trust. Subsequently an
attempt was made to tax the husband on the income of the trust accruing to the
divorced wife, on the ground that such payments were merely in lieu of alimony,
and that alimony payments are taxable to the husband.1 But the Board of Tax
Appeals ruled that the trust income constituted a gift, rather than a substitute for
alimony, since no actual provision for alimony payments had been made in the divorce
decree; and consequently it held that no basis existed for taxing the income to
the husband.2
Individuals have repeatedly been taxed on income transferred by them to second
parties by means of direct assignment, or through the establishment of trust funds;8
for it has been realized that evasion of surtaxes on income would be rendered a simple
20. The position of such a tenant at common law would be that of a tenant at suf-
ferance, who remains liable for rents, despite the termination of the lease, so long as he con-
tinues to occupy the premises and so long as the landlord treats him as a tenant. United
States v. Whipple Hardware Co., 191 F. 945 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911); Sullivan v. Hobbs, 19
Ala. App. 465, 98 So. 307 (1923), cert. denied, Ex Parte Sullivan, 210 Ala. 372, 98 So. 309
(1923); Richmond Wharf and Dock Co. v. Blake, 181 Cal. 454, 185 Pac. 184 (1919); Jack-
son v. Warren, 32 Ill. 331 (1863); Hadley v. Morrison, 39 II. 392, 398 (1886); Pepper's
Adm'r v. Harper, 20 Ky. L. R. 837, 47 S. W. 620 (1898); Burke v. Willard, 243 Mass. 547,
137 N. E. 744 (1923).
1. Willcuts v. Douglas, 73 F. (2d) 130 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); cf. Gould v. Gould, 245
U. S. 151 (1917); Mary R. Spencer, 20 B. T. A. 58 (1930). See 48 STAT. 691, 26 U. S,
C. A. § 5024(a) (1) (1934).
2. James H. Hyde, 31 B. T. A. (Oct. 3, 1934). No discussion is here devoted to the
effect of a provision in the trust agreement by which the wife waived all dower rights
In this connection see Barrett v. Failing, 111 U. S. 523 (1884); Helvering v. Butterworth,
290 U. S. 365 (1933).
3. For a general discussion of the taxation of income subsequent to its assignment, see
Surrey, Assignments of Income and Related Devices: Choice of the Taxable Person (1933)
33 Co.. L. REv. 791; Leaphart, The Use of the Trust to Escape the Imposition of Federal
Income and Estate Taxes (1930) 15 CoRN. L. Q. 587. The corporate device may also be
utilized as a method of avoiding personal income surtaxes. See DuPuy v. United States,
35 F. (2d) 990 (Ct. CL. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 739 (1930). With respect to the




process were tax liability to be shifted merely by the device of such a transfer.4 An
analysis of pertinent decisions indicates that income may be so taxed to a transferor
when either one of two possible conditions is found to exist, namely, where the
transferer retains control over the source of the income accruing to the transferee,
or where the payment of income to the latter is of financial benefit to the transferor.
Retention of control over income, sufficient to justify the imposition of a tax on
the transferor, has been found to exist in varying fact situations, as, for example,
where the validity of the assignment is denied. Thus the assignor is taxed where
the instrument of assignment is defectively worded,0 where the subject matter of
transfer is a non-assignable interest, such as income from a spendthrift trust,0 or
where the assignment has been nullified by a collateral agreement by means of which
complete ownership of the interest purportedly transferred is in fact retained by
the transferor.i Likewise, control warranting taxation has been found where the
instrument creating the beneficiary's interest is a trust deed which contains a power
of revocation exerciseable during the taxable year either by the settlor alone,8 or
by the settlor in conjunction with a trustee0 who is not also a beneficiary.' 0 An
additional reservation of taxable control exists where the transferor to a large extent
determines the size of the income accruing to the beneficiary. Thus an assignor of
profits which he may earn in the future, whether through professional fees,"L partner-
4. It has been stated, even in recent decisions, that transactions otherwise within the
exceptions contained in tax laws do not lose immunity because actuated by a desire to
escape income taxes. See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F. (2d) 809, 810 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934);
Eaton v. White, 70 F. (2d) 449, 451 (C. C. A. Ist, 1934); Jones v. Helvering, 71 F. (2d)
214, 217 (App. D. C. 1934). A more realistic treatment of tax evasion, however, may be
found in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 70 (1933).
5. Wehe v. McLaughlin, 30 F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929).
6. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Blair, 60 F. (2d) 340 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932),
cert. denied, 288 U. S. 602 (1933). But cf. Edward T. Bliss, 31 B. T. A. (Jan. 31, 1935).
7. Power v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 61 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932),
cert. denied, 288 U. S. 612 (1933); Jackson v. Commissoner of Internal Revenue, 64 F.
(2d) 359 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
8. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376 (1930), noted in (1929) 42 HAnv. L. Rnv. 958 and
(1930) 15 Mimi. L. Rrv. 129; McCauley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 44 F.
(2d) 919 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930); Clapp v. Heiner, 51 F. (2d) 224 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931);
O'Donnell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 64 F. (2d) 634 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933),
cert. denied, 290 U. S. 699 (1933). Certain more limited powers of revocation, however,
may be retained by a settlor without subjecting him to tax liability. Lewis v. Wlfite;
56 F. (2d) 390 (D. Mass. 1932), appeal isissed, 61 F. (2d) 1046 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932);
Langley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 61 F. (2d) 796 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), noted
in (1933) 46 HARv. L. Rnv. 523, and (1933) 39 W. VA. L. Q. 362. See lNote (1933) 81
U. PA. L. Rlv. 345. But cf. Du Pont v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 289 U. S.
685 (1933).
9. Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172 (1933), noted in (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 756,
and (1933) 46 HARV. L. REV. 717.
10. Smith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 59 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932);
cf. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929). See also Sidney R. Bliss, 26
B. T. A. 962 (1932) (settlor's wife having power of revocation). The pertinent statutory
provisions are found in 48 STAT. 729, 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 5166, 5167 (1934).
11. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930).
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ship income,12 or insurance commissions,18 is taxed on these earnings even though
they have been assigned to beneficiaries.' 4 The same result has been reached where
the transferor retains control over the making of leases16 or other business con-
tracts,16 the profits from which have been turned over to third persons. A final
basis of control leading to taxation has been found in certain situations where the
transferor retains merely nominal dominion over the source of the income, as through
the reservation of legal title to the property which is the source from which the
income arises. 17 In setting up the trust fund in the present case, however, the
husband refrained from reserving to himself the slightest control over the corpus
of the fund, and it consequently follows that taxation to him of income arising from
the trust can not be based upon this ground.
A second basis for taxation of income to the transferor exists where payment of
the income in question to a beneficiary is of financial benefit to the transferor,
although the latter may never actually receive the money itself, even for purposes
of effecting the transfer.18 In an analogous situation it has been held that the pay-
ment by one party of the bills or financial obligations of another constituted bene-
ficial income to the second party, which is taxable to him. Hence, when an employer
or lessee pays the income taxes assessed against his employee or lessor,10 such pay-
ments are considered as actually income taxable to the employee or lessor. It was
12. Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 136 (1932), noted in (1932) 32 CoL. L. Rv., 1080;
Mitchel v. Bowers, 15 F. (2d) 287 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 759 (1927),
noted in (1927) 36 YAL L. J. 581; Cohan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 39 F.
(2d) 540 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); Harris v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 39 F. (2d)
546 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); Luce v. Burnet, 55 F. (2d) 751 (App. D. C. 1932), noted in
(1932) 80 U. PA. L. Rxv. 916. But cf. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v, Barnes Estate,
30 F. (2d) 289 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
13. Bishop v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 54 F. (2d) 298 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931);
Parker v. Routzahn, 56 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 606 (1932).
14. These decisions must be distinguished from those in which present contract rights,
not involving future earnings, have been transferred. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Field, 42 F. (2d) 820 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); Hall v. Burnet, 54 F. (2d) 443 (App. D. C
1931), cert. denied, 285 U. S. 352 (1932), noted in (1932) 20 CALM. L. Rav. 573, and
(1932) 45 HAzy. L. Rav. 589; Nelson v. Ferguson, 56 F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932),
cert. denied, 286 U. S. 565 (1932); William E. Seatre, 25 B. T. A. 396 (1932); cf. Poe
v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930).
15. Leydig v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 43 F. (2d) 494 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930),
noted in (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1123 and (1931) 40 YArx L. J. 663.
16. Dickey v. Burnet, 56 F. (2d) 917 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 606
(1932); cf. Rosenwald v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 33 F. (2d) 423 (C. C. A.
7th, 1929), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 599 (1929); Marshall v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 57 F. (2d) 633 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 621 (1932).
17. Ward v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 58 F. (2d) 757 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932),
cert. denied, 287 U. S. 656 (1932) (assignment of rents under lease, assignor retaining title
to the lease); cf. Bing v. Bowers, 22 F. (2d) 450 (S. D. N. Y. 1927), aft'd, 26 F. (2d)
1017 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
18. Cf. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 (1933); see Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376,
378 (1930); Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172, 177 (1933).
19. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U. S. 716 (1929)
(employer); United States v. Boston and Maine Rr., 279 U. S. 732 (1929) (lessee). An
employee has been taxed on insurance premiums paid by his employer on policies taken
out by the former in favor of other individuals. Yuengling v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 69 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
inevitable, therefore, where income was formally transferred by an assignor to an-
other, but was in fact utilized to satisfy obligations which the former would otherwise
be forced to meet, that such income should be taxed to the assignor; and conse-
quently it has been held that assigned income accruing to the beneficiary is taxable
to the transferor, if such income is of financial benefit to the latter. For example,
the settlor of trusts established to pay insurance premiums on policies taken out on
his own life,20 or to provide for the support and education of his minor children,;'
has been taxed on the income from these trusts on the theory that this income is
actually of financial benefit to him, since it relieves him of the necessity of making
payments which he would otherwise have made. In the instant case it dearly ap-
pears that this second criterion warranting taxation exists, that payment of the in-
come from the trust benefited the husband, and consequently that it should be taxed
to him. The husband transferred trust income in order to avoid the necessity of
being compelled to pay alimony, which, had it been paid outright pursuant to a
formal decree, without resort to the trust device, would dearly have constituted
income taxable to him.' Had the trust been set up to meet the payments prescribed
by a formal decree, it seems clear that he would also have been so taxed;2- and
certainly the mere absence of a court decree determinative of alimony, lacking here
solely because of the deliberate precautions taken by the husband and wife, should
not afford a logical basis for reaching a different result.P The reasoning of the
Board of Tax Appeals, that the trust payments were not made in lieu of alimony,
because the divorce decree did not provide for alimony, and hence that the settlor
was not benefited by the trust income,24 ignores the avowed purpose for which the
trust was set up. In earlier decisions, the Board has apparently recognized that
similar trust income provided as a substitute for alimony was of financial benefit
to the settlor, and has upheld its taxation to him;2 5 and consequently there is reason
to believe that the federal courts, when and if the present case is appealed, will
take a similar position as to it.
APPLiCABILITY 0" THE SLx MONTHS' RuLE TO WoRIME.N'S COuVENSATIo AND
OF'ICERS' SALARY CLAIMS
TnE six months' rule, first enunciated by the Supreme Court in 1878, in the case
20. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 (1933), noted in (1933) 22 Gm. L. J. 114, (1933) 47
HARv. L. REV. 137, and (1933) 32 MicE. L. REv. 123; Du Pont v. Commissoner of
Internal Revenue, 289 U. S. 685 (1933); Yuengling v. Commisoner of Internal Revenue,
69 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934). See 48 STAT. 729, 26 U. S. C. A. § 5167(a)(3) (1934).
21. Edmund C. Schweitzer, 30 B. T. A. (March 20, 1934). But d. Percy H. Clark,
31 B. T. A. (Jan. 17, 1935) and cases cited.
22. Wilcuts v. Douglas, 73 F. (2d) 130 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), noted in (1935) 33 Mic .
L. REv. 634.
23. A possible ground of distinction, of course, lies in the fact that the income accruing
to the wife under the trust might differ from that which the court would have formally
decreed as alimony in the absence of the trust agreement. It is quite pomible, however,
that if the agreement had been brought to the attention of the court it would have decreed
as alimony the exact payments provided for by the trust. Cf. Willcuts v. Douglas, 73 F.
(2d) 130 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Mary R. Spencer, 20 B. T. A. 58 (1930).
24. S. A. Lynch, 23 B. T. A. 435 (1931); Reginald Brooks, 31 B. T. A. (Aug. 10, 1934),
noted in (1934) 34 CoL. L. REV. 1375.
25. Jacob W. Frank, 19 B. T. A. 915 (1930); cf. Scott B. Appleby, Jr., 2 B. T. A. 1051
(1925); Jane B. Coates, 3 B. T. A. 429 (1926). Also note Frank P. Welch, 12 B. T. A-
800 (1928); Frank Turner, 28 B. T. A. 91 (1933).
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of Fosdick v. Schalll was a product of the economic crisis of the period which had
brought in its wake wholesale insolvencies of railroads. The public concern made
it imperative that the operation of the railroads continue even during receivership.
In order to accomplish this the more successfully, it was deemed necessary that such
prereceivership expenses as were indispensable to maintain the railroad a "going
concern" should be satisfied.2 Consequently, the courts created the rule that certain
labor and supply claims which are a current expense of ordinary operation and which
have arisen within a period of six months prior to the appointment of a receiver
are to be accorded not only an absolute priority over all general claims but also a
qualified priority over mortgages.3 This result was justified on various grounds.
Thus an implied agreement was imputed to the mortgagees that the security shall
not apply to gross income but only to the net income after provision has been made
for current operating expenses.4 A further reason advanced was that such labor
and supplies inure directly to the benefit of the mortgage security, which thus be-
comes impressed with an equitable lien in favor of the claimants.5 But no doubt,
the major consideration was that wage earners and small supply men should not be
treated on a par with other creditors because of their inability to bear the risk and
the inequitable result which might ensue were they required to do so.0 This is
especially clear in the case of wage earners who are normally dependent on their
daily earnings and have no means of determining the impending insolvency of their
employers. Moreover, should their claims be disallowed they might to that extent
become a burden on the government. But most courts, disregarding this equitable
factor, confined the application of the six months' rule to public utilities on the
ground that the foundation of the rule is the public concern in continued operation
which is usually absent in the case of private business corporations.,
Fortunately, the necessity for the judicial extension of the rule to private cor-
1. 99 U. S. 235 (1878).
2. See Miltenberger v. Logansport Rr. Co., 106 U. S. 286, 311 (1882); Turner v. In-
dianapolis B. and W. Rr. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 14,258, at 367 (C. C. D. Ind. and S. D. Ill
1878); Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Rr. Co., 208 Fed. 168, 182 (S. D. N. Y.
1913).
3. For discussions of the general subject see 16 FLETcERi, CYcr.UorrA or Trn LAW
or PRivAuE ConpORATioNs (1933) §§ 7957-7964; FitzGibbon, The Present Status of the
Six Months' Rule (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 230; Fordham, Preferences of Prereccivcrshlp
Claims in Equity Receiverships (1931) 15 MinN. L. Rxv. 261; Wham, Preference in Rail-
road Receiverships (1928) 23 ILL. L. Ruv. 141.
4. See Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235, 252 (1878) ; FitzGibbon, supra note 3, at 233.
5. See St. Louis Trust Co. v. Riley, 70 Fed. 32, 36 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895). The im-
portance attributed to this reason is evidenced by the fact that tort claims are generally
denied preference because they are not based on any consideration accruing to the benefit
of the mortgage security. Central Trust Co. v. East Tennessee, V. and G. Rr. Co., 30
Fed. 895 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1886); St. Louis Trust Co. v. Riley, supra; Crawford v. Seattle,
R. and S. Rr. Co. 97 Wash. 651, 167 Pac. 44 (1917). Contra: Green v. Coast Line Rr.
Co., 97 Ga. 15, 24 S. E. 814 (1895); McCullough v. Union Traction Co., 186 N. E, 300
(1933), noted in (1933) 47 HAav. L. Rnv. 359; (1933) 9 IND. L. Rv. 185.
6. See Finance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Charleston, C. and C. Rr. Co., 49 Fed. 693, 694
(C. C. D. S. C. 1892); 1 CIAgx, REcErvEns (2d ed. 1929) § 676.
7. Id. § 677; Fordham, supra note 3, at 281. The six months' rule has been held Inap-
plicable to private corporations in the following cases: Seventh National Bank v. Shenan-
doah Iron Co., 35 Fed. 436 (C. C. W. D. Va. 1887); Spencer v. Taylor Creek Ditch Co.,
194 Fed. 635 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912); First National Bank v. Wyman, 16 Colo. App. 467, 66
Pac. 456 (1901); Merriam v. Victory Mining Co., 37 Ore. 321, 60 Pac. 997 (1900).
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porations or for the establishment of a similar equitable rule to safeguard wage
claims was obviated in a large measure by statutes passed in numerous states granting
wage claims a preference or lien against the assets of an insolvent person, firm, or com-
pany.s While a paucity of decisions makes it difficult to determine whether such
preference statutes gover in federal equity receivership, they may properly be
considered by the federal courts and may well be applied if the priority prescribed
is equitable and just.9 In the absence of such statutes some state courts extended
the six months' rule to private corporations on the theory that the gravamen of the
rule is the equitable consideration which asserts itself in favor of wage claims .2
Claims may arise, however, which are equally as meritorious as wage claims and
which are not provided for by statute. This is illustrated by the recent case of
Bowen v. Hockley'1 where the problem was presented whether payments on a work-
men's compensation award prior to the appointment of a receiver should be continued
during the receivership.-2 The claim was sustained on the ground that a court of
equity must hold these payments necessary expenses of the receivership in operating
a business and conserving its value as a going concern. Since the claim accrued
before receivership and the payments might be transmuted into a single lump sum,
the problem was substantially one of preference of a prereceivership claim. Although
the court declared that it merely relied on the six months' rule as an analogy, the
result reached is essentially an adaptation of that rule to a situation which lacks
all the requirements originally thought necessary to the application of the rule"
except the element of a strong equity. But the adaptation is clearly justifiable since
the claim arose out of the employer-employee relationship and is entitled to equal
protection with wage claims.
But it seems inadvisable that courts should either extend the six months' rule or
rely on it as an analogy in situations where the equities are not so obvious. In
the case of Pyrites Co. v. Silica Gel Corporation,'4 an attempt was made, in reliance
on the rule, and on the holding in Bowen v. Hockley, to obtain priority for the
salaries of officers of a private corporation in an operating receivership. The court
disallowed the claims on the ground that there was no such equity in favor of officers
as to warrant an application of the six months' rule.
It may be argued that officers' salaries are sufficiently similar to laborers' wages
to warrant their inclusion within the ambit of preferred claims. Officers are as
8. For a compilation and discussion of the statutes see Kauper, Insohvecy Statiues
Preferring Wages Due Employees (1932) 30 Mica. L. R-v. 504.
9. See Crampton v. Lautz Bros. and Co., 274 Fed. 743 (W. D. X. Y. 1921); Mastin
and Co. v. Pickering Lumber Co., 2 F. Supp. 605, 606 (N. D. Cal. 1933); 1 CrLAnx, op.
cit. supra note 6, § 675(a) ; Fordham, supra note 3, at 287.
10. But the extension has been limited to wage claims. Drennen v. Mercantile Trust
and Deposit Co., 115 Ala. 592, 23 So. 164 (1896); LeHote v. Boyet, 85 Mliss. 636, 33
So. 1 (1904); George v. Pigford, 97 Miss. 332, 52 So. 796 (1910); cf. Fordham, sup-a
note 3, at 281.
11. 71 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), noted in (1934) 34 COL. L. Rnv. 1558; (1935)
19 MAinm. L. REv. 253.
12. Petitioner's husband died as a result of injuries received in the service of a chemical
company. Payments were regularly made until the company went into receivership. The
receivers, who continued the operation of the company as a going concern, declined to
make any further payments. The petition that the receivers be required to continue the
payments was denied by the lower court on the ground that under the Maryland Work-
men's Compensation Statute the payments were not entitled to preference.
13. See (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1558.
14. 8 F. Supp. 423 (D. Mld. 1934).
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necessary to the continued operation of the company as laborers, and it might be
advisable to give their claims similar protection in order to prevent their possible
exodus during a period of financial embarrassment.' 5 Moreover, in individual in-
stances, an officer may be as dependent on his salary as a worker on his wages.
The argument that officers should be denied a preference because they are respon-
sible for the precarious condition of the company has little merit, since it disregards
the fact that economic conditions over which the officers have no control are gen-
erally the operative forces leading to insolvency.
But if the dominant basis of the six months' rule, as applied in recent cases, is
purely a revolt against harsh inequity, and if the approved policy is to limit the
application of the rule, the arguments in favor of officers' claims need not be given
effect. Officers' salaries may be differentiated from wage claims on the basis under-
lying the distinction of wage claims from others, viz., the financial status of wage
earners. Disregarding the corporate fiction, officers of managerial rank are more
correctly characterized as employers than as employees. Their services are ordin-
arily more marketable, and they are in a better position to bear the risk. These
considerations are reflected in the wage preference statutes which are generally con-
strued to exclude officers' salaries.16 In fact, even in public utilities, where the public
concern in continued operation was originally said to justify the preferences, officers
would not be permitted to benefit. 17 The result reached in the Pyrites case is,
therefore, dictated not only by the legislative purpose and policy of many states but
also by the accepted judicial policy in regard to the restriction of the six months' rule.
APPORTIONMENT OF ORniNARY TAXES BETWEEN Lm TENANT AND
REMAINDERMEN
TESTATOR directed his trustee to pay the net income from certain real estate,
which he owned, to his widow during her lifetime and, upon her death, to transfer
the property to specified remaindermen. During the life tenancy, the ordinary city
taxes, assessed in advance, were paid out of the income from the property. Thirty-
seven days after a current tax, assessed for the ensuing year, had become a lien
upon the property, the widow died, and the trustee, in doubt as to the proper
allocation of the charge for the taxes as between the estate of the life tenant and
the remaindermen, applied to the court for instructions. The court decreed that
since no income had accrued to the life tenant's estate after her death, no burden
15. This seems to be the rationale of the New Jersey wage preference statute, 2 Coup,
STAT. (1910) Corp. Act, § 83, p. 1650, which is interpreted to include managers and
executive officers within the preferred class. Buvinger v. Evening Union Printing Co., 72
N. J. Eq. 321, 65 AUt. 482 (1907); Lammerding v. Lammerding Lumber and Supply Co.,
107 N. J. Eq. 551, 153 Atl. 380 (1931); see Kauper, supra note 8, at $08.
16. FLETCmE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 7952; Fordham, supra note 3, at 289. Officers
are similarly denied preference under Section 64 b(S) of the Bankruptcy Act, 44 STArT.
666 (1926), 11 U. S. C. A. § 104 (Supp. 1934), which accords a priority to wages earned
within three months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding in bankruptcy,
2 COLLIER, BAM um'CY (13th ed. 1923) 1467.
17. It has been held that a president is not entitled to such a preference on the ground
that he is in a position to know the financial condition of his corporation and is not bound
to furnish his services should his compensation appear uncertain. National Bank of Augusta
v. Carolina K. and W. Rr. Co., 63 Fed. 25 (C. C. D. S. C. 1894); Title Ins. Co. v. Homo
Telephone Co. of Puget Sound, 200 Fed. 263 (W. D. Wash. 1912). The same reasoning
is said to be equally applicable to bar the preferences of other officers. See Fordham,
supra note 3, at 268.
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should be borne by it after that time, and therefore mathematically apportioned
the tax between the life tenant's estate and the remaindermen proportionate with
the time during which each had enjoyed the benefits of the property.'
The relationship between a life tenant and the remaindermen has been envisaged
as one of quasi-trust.2 It has therefore been held that, unless the creator of the
tenancy has clearly manifested an intention to the contrary,3 a life tenant who is
in possession of productive real estate,4 or who is receiving the income from realty
held in trust,5 must pay the ordinary taxes thereon,0 since he is under a duty to
keep the property free from all encumbrances, at least to the extent of the income
which he receives.7 But, since taxes are ordinarily assessed and payable in advance,
1. In re Hone's Estate, 152 Misc. 221, 274 N. Y. Supp. 101 (Surr. Ct. 1934). A
secondary basis for the holding of the court was the fact that the tax asesments, during
the entire life tenancy, had been assessed, not against the life tenant or the trustee, but
against the estate of the testator and, thus, they had never become a personal liability of
the life beneficiary.
2. Hardy v. Mayhew, 158 Cal. 95, 110 Pac. 113 (1910); Peck v. Smith, 227 N. Y.
228, 125 N. E. 91 (1919); Trinimer v. Darden, 61 S. C. 220, 39 S. E. 373 (1901).
3. Rothschild v. Weinthal, 191 Ind. 85, 131 N. E. 917 (1921); Chamberlin v. Gleason,
163 N. Y. 214, 57 N. E. 487 (1900); Matter of Limburger, 128 Misc. 577, 219 N. Y.
Supp. 619 (Surr. Ct. 1927); Matter of Schulz, 133 Misc. 168, 231 N. Y. Supp. 677 (Surr.
Ct. 1928).
4. It is generally held that the remaindermen must pay the taxes on unproductive
property, even while it is held by the life tenant. Murch v. J. 0. Smith Mfg. Co, 47
N. J. Eq. 193, 20 At. 213 (Ch. IS90); Woolston v. Pullen, 88 N. J. Eq. 35, 102 At.
461 (Ch. 1917); Sweeney v. Schoneberger, 111 Misc. 718, 186 N. Y. Supp. 707 (Sup. Ct
1919); 1 THomrpsoN, REAL PRoPERTY (1924) § 739; 1 TIFFAny Rr.L Pnorrsr (2d ed.
1920) § 33.
5. In re Mlorton's Estate, 74 N. J. Eq. 797, 70 At. 6S0 (1909); Spencer v. Spencer,
219 N. Y. 459, 114 N. E. 849 (1916).
6. Rothschild v. Weinthal, 191 Ind. 85, 131 N. E. 917 (1921); King v. Boettcher,
96 Neb. 319, 147 N. W. 836 (1914); Criswell v. McKnight, 120 Neb. 317, 232 N. W. 5S6
(1930); Matter of Babcock, 115 N. Y. 450, 22 N. E. 263 (1889); Westervelt v. Hausner,
275 N. Y. Supp. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1934); CooLEiY, TA-Ano0; (4th ed. 1924) §§ 594, 1107,
1265; THomasoN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 739; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 33.
7. A life tenant need not expend any more for taxes than the amount of the income
from the property. TI"FANY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 33. But, if he refuses to allot
this amount to taxes, the remainderman may either pay them himself and recover the
amount paid from the life tenant, or he may obtain the appointment of a receiver to
collect the revenues from the property and use them for the payment of taxes. Sage v.
City of Gloversville, 43 App. Div. 245, 60 N. Y. Supp. 791 (3d Dep't, IS99); Sweeney
v. Schoneberger, 111 Misc. 718, 186 N. Y. Supp. 707 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Keeley v. Clark,
125 Misc. 541, 211 N. Y. Supp. 391 (Sup. Ct. 1925); THaoanso, op. cit. supra note 4,
§ 739. See Nxw Yo= REAL ProPErTr Lw § 269.
The life tenant must also apply the income from the property to keep down the interest
on encumbrances, but he need not pay off the principal sum when it becomes due. If,
to preserve the estate, he is forced to pay off an encumbrance entirely, be is entitled to
reimbursement from the remaindermen to the extent of their interest in the land. Troy
v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 174 Ala. 380, 56 So. 982 (1911); Defreese v. Lake, I09
Mich. 415, 67 N. W. 505 (1896); Whitney v. Salter, 36 Mlinn. 103, 30 N. W. 755 (18S6);
TFFAwy, op. cit. supra note 4, § 33. The rule is that the payment by the life tenant
of the present worth of an annuity equal to the annual intereAt running during his ex-
pectancy of life represents his individual indebtedness; and the balance, after deducting
that sum from the entire encumbrance, is the share which the remaindermen should con-
the peculiar problem typified by the instant case has arisen. The taxable status
of all property is said to be related to a certain day in the year, described as
"tax day,"8 and the holder of the land as of that day is said to be personally liable
for all of the taxes for the ensuing year, regardless of subsequent eventualitles.
0
Some courts have therefore refused to allow any apportionment of taxes, even
when the life tenant died a few days after tax day.10 Others, however, have been
persuaded to distribute proportionately the burden.1" At common law this con-
troversy arose not only concerning the charges on property, such as taxes, but also
concerning its benefits, such as rents, for it was formerly held that rent was not
apportionable as to time and that only the holder of the property on the day fixed
for the payment of rent could collect it.12 Thus, if a life tenant died on the day
before rents were due for a period already past, his estate was precluded from
any recovery from the under-tenant whatsoever, since his ownership had not existed
when the rent became due.' 3 It was soon evident, however, that so crude a policy
worked unfortunate and unjust14 results, and, in most jurisdictions, statutes have
been enacted which provide for the equitable apportionment of rents payable after
the death of the life tenant, between his estate and the remaindermen. 15 But no
tribute. Damm v. Damm, 109 Mich. 619, 67 N. W. 984 (1896); Tindall v. Pcterson,
71 Neb. 160, 98 N. W. 688 (1904); Draper v. Clayton, 87 Neb. 443, 127 N. W. 369 (1910).
8. There is no standard definition of "tax day", but largely as a matter of admin-
istrative convenience, most jurisdictions have adopted some day on which personal liability
is said to attach to a property owner on his taxes. See, for example, Lantz' Estate v.
McDaniel, 190 N. E. 130 (Ind. 1934) ("our decisions seem to treat all taxes as accruing
on the 1st day of March when the lien attaches to the property."); Matter of Babcock,
115 N. Y. 450, 22 N. E. 263 (1889); COOLEY-, op. cit. supra note 6, § 546. At common
law, property taxes are not personal liabilities of the owner, but the power of the legis-
lature to make them so is unquestioned. See CooLtw, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1327; CoNN,
Rxv. STAT. (1930) c. 63, § 1231; N. Y. Laws 1909, c. 62, § 71, as amended by N. Y. Laws
1916, c. 323, N. Y. Laws 1917, c. 356, and N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 610, § 1.
9. See Cooa m, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 546, 587, 594.
10. Brodie v. Parsons, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 831 (1901); Holmes v. Taber, 91 Mass. 246
(1864); Robinson v. Bowler, 18 Ohio C. C. N. S. 372 (1911); Sutton v. Chaplin, 10
Ves. 66 (1804).
11. Sturges v. Rehm, 8 Ohio N. P. N. S. 486 (Ct. Common Pleas, 1909); Matter of
Schulz, 133 Misc. 168, 231 N. Y. Supp. 677 (Surr. Ct. 1928); Fest's Estate, 28 W. N. C.
415 (Pa. Orphan's Ct. 1891); Crump's Estate, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 286 (1893); Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co. v. Harris, 20 R. I. 408, 39 At]. 750 (1898). See also O'Donnell v.
Mathews, 284 S. W. 204 (Mo. 1926).
12. TInANY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 410.
13. Dexter v. Phillips, 121 Mass. 178 (1876); Perry v. Aldrich, 13 N, H. 343 (1843).
14. It is probable that the strict rule at first was thought to work unfortunate rather
than unjust results. Rent was thought of, not as accruing from day to day, but as an
amount payable on a certain day, and therefore the medieval mind saw no injustice In
making a tenant liable only to a landlord alive on rent day. However, as rent gradually
came to be regarded as a toll paid for the day to day occupation of land, the injustices
of non-apportionment became more apparent and the enactment of remedial legislation
followed.
15. See, e.g., IowA CODE (1931) § 10156; Naw YORX SURROOATE'S COURT AcT § 204;
Pa. Laws 1917, no. 447, § 35(e); T ExNssEE CODE (1932) § 8406; 11 Geo. 1I, c. 19, see.
15 (1738); 4 Win. IV, c. 22 (1834). A complete compilation of the American statutes
may be found in REsTATE:Z =, PROPERTY (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1931) § 164. For the
historical background of the New York statute see Matter of Juilliard, 238 N. Y. 499,
144 N. E. 772 (1924).
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statutes have been passed to provide for a similar apportionment of the burdens
of property ownership.
Nevertheless, it would seem only just and reasonable that the.same equities which
demand an apportionment of burdens between the estate of a life tenant and the
remaindermen, should demand a corresponding division of burdens, since the close
interrelationship between the two is commonly recognized. It is the repeatedly
stated theory of the law that he who receives the benefits must bear the correlative
burdens, but no more.16 It is true that a vendor who sells property after tax day
is not thereby relieved of his personal liability for the taxes,'-, nor does the death
of the owner of property, after tax day, affect his tax liability.', But these rules
are not applicable to the instant problem. One who sells property after becoming
personally liable for the taxes thereon, can easily allow for such liability by an
increase in the selling price. Similarly, one who does not wish his estate to be
burdened by property taxes assessed for the year of his death may expressly provide
in his will that the payment of such taxes by those who are to take the property
be a condition precedent to the vesting of title in them, and, having received the
property, the takers would be estopped from complaining of the burden so imposed.
A life tenant cannot so protect himself, for he neither gets any remuneration upon
the passing of ownership, nor can he impose any conditions upon the passage. Con-
sequently, when a vendor or a devisor of real estate makes no express provisions
for shifting the burden of current taxes, it may be presumed that it was his inten-
tion to bear the charge himself, but it is apparent that no such presumption is
available in the case of a life tenant. There is, however, the possible argument
that since the testator could have made a provision for the apportionment of taxes
between the life tenant and the remainderman, his failure to do so indicates an
intention that they should not be apportioned. But the truth is more probably that
the testator never considered the problem. Moreover, such reasoning would, in some
cases, lead to curious results. In the event that tax day fell shortly after the
testator's death, and the life tenant died shortly after tax day, the result of the
argument would be to say that the testator intended the life tenant to be liable for
the burden even though no benefit was ever received. This sounds highly artificial.
To allow an apportionment of the tax burden, as in the instant case, need not
impose any difficulties on the tax administration. There is no reason why the state
should in any way concern itself with the apportionment of taxes. For the sake
of administrative convenience, it may continue its practice of levying an entire
year's taxes against the estate of the life tenant, who was alive and the holder of
the property on tax day. But the issue of administration does not arise and need
not be considered in a dispute between the remaindermen and the life tenant's estate
over the apportionment of taxes. Such a controversy might readily be resolved
by the courts without in any way affecting the primary liability of the life tenant,
as the property holder on tax day, to the state.
A LMIhTATION ON THE DocTRnm or Swi't v. TysoN-QuEsroNs "B AM;cz
WITH DOUBT"
ImPELED by the desire to promote uniformity of decision in cases where the
diversity of results ensuing from a multiplicity of independent jurisdictions within
the country proved to create troublesome economic barriers, Mr. Justice Story
16. Coo=.x, op. cit. supra note 6, § 287.
17. CooL-z, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 587, 1267.
18. Matter of Babcock, 115 N. Y. 450, 22 N. E. 263 (1881); In re Franlin, 26 Mc.
107, 56 N. Y. Supp. 858 (Surr. Ct. 1899).
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enunciated the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson.' He there declared that in matters of
commercial law the United States courts would not be bound by decisions in the
various states, but .would reach an independent judgment. In the same term of
court the principle was held to be applicable to questions 
of insurance law as well.,
Based upon a statutory construction to the effect that "laws"
3 does not embrace
within its meaning court decisions, the result springs from a concept of law as a
"brooding omnipresence in the skies" rather than a set of rules deriving authority
from a particular sovereign power.
4 Now extended to all matters of "general juris-
prudence," the doctrine has faced incessant condemnation not only because of its
jurisprudential unsoundness, but also because of its practical failure to perform its
announced function in many instances.5
It is evident that if the state courts refuse to follow the federal rule,
0 the only
uniformity attained will be within the federal courts, and instead of producing one
uniform rule throughout the nation, the doctrine will create the concurrent existence
of two diverse principles of law within the same state. The most vigorous advocate
of Swift v. Tyson will not contend that substantive rights should thus be made to
depend upon the amount of the claim or upon the citizenship of the parties, much
less upon a choice of forum made by one of them. While a strong argument exists
for the development of a certain and uniform body of insurance law so that insurers
may achieve a high degree of actuarial accuracy, especially since their business is
national rather than local in character, experience indicates that Swift v, Tyson
does not afford the practical route to this result. In several situations in insurance
law the possibility that diversity rather than uniformity would result has proved
an actuality, and different results are reached in the state and federal tribunals on
identical sets of facts.
7
1. 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
2. Carpenter v. Providence Washington Insurance Co., 16 Pet. 495 (U. S. 1842).
3. 1 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. A. § 725 (1926). That this interpretation Is erroneous
as a construction of legislative intent, see Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37 HAxv. L. REv. 49, at 84ff.
4. Holmes, J., dissenting, in Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown
and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, at 532 (1928); GRAY, TE NATvu n
AND Sou cEs or =Hn LAW (2d ed. 1921) 251 et seq.; Comment (1928) 77 U. or PA.
L. REV. 105, at 107; Comment (1924) 33 Y=x.. L. J. 855, at 857.
5. GRAe, loc. cit. supra note 4; Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift v, Tyson (1930)
16 VA. L. REv. 225, at 240; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499, at 526 ff.; Johnson, State Law and
the Federal Courts (1929) 17 KY. L. J. 355; Meigs, Decisions of the Federal Courts on
Questions of State Law (1911) 45 Am. L. REv. 47; Rand, Swift v. Tyson versus Gelpche
v. Dubuque (1895) 8 HARv. L. REv. 328. But cf. Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts Based on Diversity of Citizenship (1929) 78 U. or PA. L. REv. 179, at 189ff.;
Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-Made State Law in State and Federal
Courts (1910) 4 ILL. L. R-v. 533.
6. That they can, see Pennsylvania ,r. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477 (1903); Melgs,
supra note 5, at 73. That they do, see Frankfurter, supra note 5, at 529, n. 150, That
they should not be allowed to, see Schofield, supra note 5.
7. Cf. Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Thorne, 180 Fed. 82 (C. C. A. 1st, 1910) and Thorne
v. Casualty Co. of America, 106 Me. 274, 76 Ati. 1106 (1909); Meigs v. London Assur-
ance Co., 126 Fed. 781 (E. D. Pa. 1904) and Meigs v. Insurance Co. of North America,
205 Pa. 378, 54 At. 1053 (1903); Spinks v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, 137
Fed. 169 (C. C. E. D. Ky. 1905); Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Sptnks, 119 Ky.
261, 83 S. W. 615 (1904); Wood v. Massachusetts Protective Association, 34 F. (2d)
501 (E. D. Ky. 1929), noted in (1930) 15 CoRN. L. Q. 307.
[Vol. 44
1935] NOTES 1115
In Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson,
8 a case coming up through the federal
courts, the ultimate question for decision was whether physical and mental inca-
pacity of the insured constituted a sufficient excuse for failure to give proof of
disability so that the insurer might be held to its promise to pay a monthly income
and to waive subsequent premium payments. Although there is some language in
the opinion tending to indicate that the question is not of the sort falling within
the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. because it involves only the construction of a
specialized clause rather than the application of some general principle of insurance
law,9 precedent would seem to establish clearly that Swift v. Tysont is applicable to
such a question.' 0 Yet, since the authorities on the subject were widely split, eight
cases being cited on one side and ten on the other,'" the Court determined to follow
the decision reached in Virginia,' 2 where the contract was made, rather than attempt
to make an independent choice as to which of the rules was preferable in a ques-
tion so "balanced with doubt."
This is not new doctrine. It was first announced over fifty years ago in a case
considering the effect of a decision handed down by a state court after the rights
in controversy had accrued. 13 Although it has since been considered applicable
to cases falling strictly within the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, in most of these cases
the rule has either been found inapposite to the particular circumstances involved
14
or has been used to confirm a result independently approved.
15 The only two
8. 55 S. Ct. 154 (1934), noted in (1935) 83 U. or PA. L. R'. 523.
9. Id. at 156.
10. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Moore, 231 U. S. 543, 559 (1913) (effect of agreement
that none but executive officers can vary terms of policy); McKelvie v. Mutual Benefit
Life Insurance Co. of Newark, N. J., 287 Fed. 660, 663 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923) (liability
before payment of first premium); Hawkeye Commercial Mien's Association v. Christy,
294 Fed. 208, 211 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923) (construction of provision exempting insurer from
liability in certain circumstances); Long v. Monarch Accident Insurance Co. of Spring-
field, Mass., 30 F. (2d) 929, 930 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) (duty to apply benefits to overdue
premiums; excuse from requirement for notice of disability); Pilot Life Insurance Co
v. Owen, 31 F. (2d) 862, S64 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) (what constitutes total disability;
what constitutes waiver of default); Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Pospisll, 52 F. (2d)
709, 712 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) (proof of loss as a condition precedent to recovery); Ford
v. Grocers' Mutual Insurance Co., 4 F. Supp. 911, 913 (W. D. Pa. 1931) (revocability
of covenant providing for appraisal before suit); Lawson v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co.,
2 F. Supp. 171, 173, 174 (E. D. Ky. 1932) (application of parol evidence rule to waiver
or estoppel; effect of provision invalidating policy if foreclosure proceedings be com-
menced); O'Brien v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., 64 F. (2d) 33, 36 (C. C. A.
8th, 1933) (what constitutes death by accidental means); see also cases cited in note 7,
supra; Sharp and Brennan, The Application of the Doctrine of Swift v. Tyson since IgoD
(1929) 4 lam. L. J. 367, at 374-375.
11. Id. at 155-156.
12. Swann v. Atlantic Life Insurance Co., 156 Va. 852, 159 S. E. 192 (1931).
13. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 33 (1882). See also Wilson v. Standefer, 184
U. S. 399, 412 (1902); Tampa Water Works Co. v. Tampa, 199 U. S. 241, 243 (190S);
Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 360 (1910); Moore-Mansfield Construction Co.
v. Electrical Installation Co., 234 U. S. 619, 625 (1914); Lankford v. Platte Iron Works
Co., 235 U. S. 461, 474 (1915).
14. Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and
Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518 (1928); Fordson Coal Co. v. Kentucky River Coal Corporation,
69 F. (2d) 131 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934).
15. Sir v. Edenborn, 242 U. S. 131 (1916); Trainor Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co., 290 U. S. 47 (1933).
previous cases actually employing the rule to reach the result which it indicates,
arrive at the conclusion that the question is "balanced with doubt" because of the
existence of a considerable split of authority16 and because of the lack of a strong
reason to depart from the state rule.
17
No very definite test can be formulated to determine when a question is "balanced
with doubt." The process involved is the drawing of a line of compromise with
Swift v. Tyson, and the complete subordination of the federal tribunals to those
of the states. Perhaps it can best be stated in the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo,
18
"The summum jus of power, whatever it may be, will be subordinated at times to
a benign and prudent comity. At least in cases of uncertainty we steer away from
a collision between courts of state and nation when harmony can be attained with-
out the sacrifice of ends of national importance." Nothing more concrete than this
would be satisfactory, for the usefulness of the rule lies in its flexibility. It is
expressed in such a way as to foreshadow extensive use in the very situation in
which an escape from the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is desirable, namely, when
uniformity is probably not attainable. That is to say, when it becomes apparent
that, because of an existing body of precedent or for other reasons, the state courts
are unlikely to follow a different federal rule on any specific question, that question
may be held to be "balanced with doubt," so that the state law wl be followed
in the federal courts. Thus, the practical effect of the decision is the only criterion
provided for the application of this device by which Story's doctrine and its harmful
results may be avoided without resort to any measures so drastic as a judicial over-
ruling or remedial legislation, which have been frequently suggested.10
LIABILITY OF THE PROCEEDS OF A SPENDTHRIFT TRUST FOR TAX CLAIMS
THE decedent created by his will a spendthrift trust, the income from which, under
the laws of the state,1 could not be reached by creditors, except for ten per cent or
by an action in equity to impound the surplus remaining after the payment of neces-
sary expenses. The beneficiary of the trust sought to compel the payment to him
of the trust income against which the Federal Government had filed a lien for un-
paid taxes. It was held that the tax lien asserted by the Government did not extend
to the income, and therefore the petition of the beneficiary was granted.2
Despite the attacks of Gray and other legal scholars against the spendthrift trust
device,3 a large majority of American jurisdictions enforce spendthrift provisions in
16. Community Building Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 8 F. (2d) 678 (C. C. A. 5th,
1925), cert. denied, 270 U. S. 652 (1926). This also seems to be the reason in the prin.
cipal case.
17. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Lucas, 66 F. (2d) 116 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
18. 55 S. Ct. 154, at 156.
19. Dobie, supra note 5, at 241; Frankfurter, supra note 5, at 530; Meigs, supra note .,
at 76; Sharp and Brennan, supra note 10, at 384-85; Note (1930) 14 Mnwi. L. REv. 684;
Comment (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 855, at 859. But cf. Brown, supra note 5, at 189 et seq,
1. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1909) § 15; N. Y. RrAL PROP. LAW (1909) § 103.
2. In re Estate of Henry Rosenberg, 153 Msc. 46, 274 N. Y. Supp. 482 (Surr.
Ct. 1934).
3. GP.AY, REsTRAINTs ON Tm ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895); FOULxE, Tn.
RuLEs AOAINST PERPTrrIEs, RESTRAINTS ON ALIEATION AND RsTRAWnTS ON ENJOMCxNT
AS APPLICABLE TO Girs or" PROPERTY iN PENNsYLvAm (1909); Horack, Spendthrift Trusts
in Iowa (1918) 4 IowA L. Bu=z. 139; Kales, Comment (1913) 7 Iu. L. REV. 445, 448-51;
Runk, infra note 4. Contra: Costigan, Those Protective Trusts Which Are Miscalled "Spend.
thrift Trusts" Reexamined (1934) 22 CAIxF. L. REv. 471; Rendell, The Protection of Prodi-
gals (1913) 38 LAw IM&,. & REv. 422.
[Vol. 44YALE LAW JOURNAL1116
trust indentures,4 and generally neither the corpus nor the income is available to
creditors of the beneficiary. The basic rule invoked is that a testator should be able
to dispose of his property as he sees fit.G Although hardship may result from the
rule's application, it was reasoned by the Supreme Court in Nichols v. Eaton that
the creditor is neither defrauded nor injured, "as he knows, when he parts with the
consideration of his debt, that the property so exempt can never be made liable to its
payment. Nothing is withdrawn from this liability which was ever subject to it or
to which he had a right to look for its discharge in payment."10 So far as it goes,
such reasoning could be used with respect to a claim for back taxes.7 Nothing is
withdrawn, because the beneficiary is said not to own the proceeds of the trust, the
legal estate to which is in the trustee,8 until they are actually paid to him, when they
become liable to his creditors just as his other belongings are liable. The Govern-
ment, if it wished, could enact a statute creating an exception in its favor. The
absence of any statute making the income from a spendthrift trust subject to claims
for taxes,9 it could be argued, supports the decision of the court in the principal case.
Indeed, the absence of another reported case on the point at issue would suggest that
the Government never before had assumed authority to seize the income from a
spendthrift trust. But the strongest argument in favor of the principal decision is
that the trust provision makes no exception for tax claims and that, accordingly, it is
not to be supposed that testator intended the trust income to be applied for taxes any
more than for other obligations of the beneficiary.
There are, however, strong reasons for believing that the Government should be
able to reach property in satisfaction of a tax claim, even though the property is
immune to private creditors. If a testator provided merely that the income was not
to be liable for the "debts" or "contracts," or to "creditors" of the beneficiary, there
would be no express intention to secure the income from tax claims, since taxes are
not debts in the ordinary sense.10 They do not arise from contract, and do not create
4. Probably the only states that refuse to enforce spendthrift trust provisions are North
Carolina, Rhode Island and Virginia. See Runk, American Statutory Modifications of the
Rude Against Perpetuities, Of Trusts for Accumulation and of Spendthrift Trusts (1932)
80 U. or PA. L. Rrv. 397, cases cited at 405. There may be some doubt as to the validity of
spendthrift trusts in New Jersey: L'Hommedieu v. L'Hommedicu, 98 N. J. Eq. 554, 131
Atl. 302 (1925); and in Ohio: White, Restraints On Alienation, Spendthrift Trusts, ad
Indestructible Trusts in Ohio (1928) 2 U. or Cmn. L. REv. 333. Until 1930 their validity
was somewhat uncertain in Minnesota. Bunn, Spendthrift Trusts In Minnesota (1934) 18
Min N. L. REv. 493, 496.
5. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716 (1875); Shelton v. King, 229 U. S. 90 (1913);
Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882). For historical growth see
Jones v. Harrison, 7 F. (2d) 461 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
6. 91 U. S. 716, at 726 (1875).
7. But the argument would seem to have little validity with respect to modem urban
conditions, since more likely than not the creditor would have had no knowledge that
the debtor was a spendthrift or that his income was immune to debts.
8. N. Y. REAL PRop. LAW (1909) § 100.
9. Under the federal statute invoked by the Government in the principal case, a lien
for back taxes extends "upon all property and rights to property, whether real or peronal,
belonging to such person." 26 U. S. C. A. § 115 (1926). It could be urged that the
beneficiary's right to enforce payment of the trust income to him constitutes a property
interest or right to property. See notes 33 and 35, infra.
10. See Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71 (U. S. 1863); Meriwether v. Garrett, 102
U. S. 472, 513 (1880); Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 553, 137 AUt. 802, S05 (1927).
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a debtor-creditor relation between the parties unless so provided by statute.11 Neither
would such spendthrift language necessarily constitute an implied intention to save
the income from application toward satisfaction of a tax claim. Spendthrift trusts
were devised by lenient fathers of improvident sons,12 not for the purpose of avoid-
ing predictable expenses, such as for food, clothing, medical treatment13 and taxes,
but for the opposite purpose of insuring the supply of means for meeting these neces-
sary costs in order to protect the son from his own extravagance, 14 to keep him out
of poorhouse and jail.15 Thus, on the ground that the testator so contemplated, the
income has been charged with the support of the wife and children of the benifi-
ciary,'0 and in other cases with maintenance of the beneficiary in a state institution,
1
Similarly, in the principal situation, if the court had been willing to treat the tax
claims as necessary expenses within the testator's intention,18 a different result would
have been reached.1 9
11. Under the Bankruptcy Act a tax is given priority and is held to be a debt. 11
U. S. C. A. § 104(a) (1926). In re J. Menist & Co., Inc., 290 Fed. 947 (C. C. A, 2d,
1923) ; rev'd on the question of interest, United States v. Childs, 266 U. S. 304 (1924);
McDowell v. City of Barberton, Ohio, 38 F. (2d) 786, 788 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930).
12. The pioneer cases upholding spendthrift provisions are: Fisher v. Taylor, 2 Rawle
33 (Pa. 1829); Overman's Appeal, 88 Pa. 276 (1879); Thackara v. Mlntzer, 100 Pa. 151
(1882); Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882) (brother).
13. Sherman v. Shuse, 166 N. Y. 345, 59 N. E. 990 (1901).
14. See Note (1925) 9 Mrx. L. REv. 562, 565-6. See also MASS. Gn.x. LAWS (1932)
c. 4, § 7 (30). But in the absence of statute a court will not inquire into whether the
beneficiary is in fact a spendthrift. Wagner v. Wagner, 244 Ill. 101, 91 N. E. 66 (1910).
15. Resort has been made to these arguments in efforts to find an Intention on the
part of the testator. England v. England, 223 Ill. App. 549 (1922); Com. v. Cozens, 25
Pa. Dist. R. 177 (1916); Guernsey v. Lazear, 51 W. Va. 328, 41 S. E. 405 (1902). But,
to avoid the risk of jail, the beneficiary might order the trustee to pay the proceeds
directly to the destitute family, or to the tax-collector, and, providing the testator had not
directed the proceeds to be delivered into the hands of the cestui, the trustee in his dis.
cretion could do so. See dissent in Kiffner v. Kiffner, 185 Ia. 1064, 1067, 171 N. W. 590,
591 (1919). There might be a question of whether such action would be in fraud of
creditors. And under the New York statutes the right to trust funds may not be assigned,
In re Wilkening's Will, 137 Misc. 451, 244 N. Y. Supp. 115 (Suir. Ct. 1930), following
Matter of Ungrich, 201 N. Y. 415, 94 N. E. 999 (1911). Elsewhere the beneficiary'o
interest is held to be unassignable. (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. REv. 480. Nor may the trust
be terminated. Evans, The Termination of Trusts (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1070, 1081 et seq.;
(1925) 9 MniN. L. REv. 562.
16. Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 Atl. 802 (1927), noted in (1927) 76 U. or
PA. L. RaV. 220; Griswold, Reaching The Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust
(1929) 43 HARv. L. REV. 63; Comment (1933) 21 CALIr. L. REv. 142.
17. In re Spangler, 3 Pa. D. & C. 616 (1923); Walter's Case, 278 Pa. 421, 123 Atl,
408 (1924) (beneficiary in an asylum when the will was made); In re Hohenshleldt's
Estate, 105 Pa. Super. Ct. 18, 159 At. 71 (1932); Town of Shrewsbury v. Bucklin, 163
AtI. 626 (Vt. 1933), noted in (1933) 18 IowA L. REV. 550; (1933) 81 U. or PA, L. R v.
1009.
18. Support of a beneficiary's family has been included as one of "his needs" for which
the will provided. Eaton v. Lovering, 81 N. H. 275, 125 Atl. 433 (1924). Support of
the government could well be treated similarly.
19. It would be difficult, however, to discover that a testator intended the income to
be available for taxes incurred by the beneficiary prior to the creation of the trust, In
the case of maintenance by the state, recovery may be had only for the cost of main.
But even supposing that the sole purpose of the trust was to prevent the estate
from being squandered,20 and that testator expressly had stated that the income was
to be immune from tax claims, the question would remain whether such a disposition
would not be illegal as tending to interfere with an essential function of the gov-
ernment.2 ' Where the intentions of an individual are inconsistent with public policy,
the latter prevails. Apparently the protection of public funds from private uses has
been the determining factor where the income of a spendthrift trust has been held
applicable to the expense of maintaining the beneficiary in a state institution.P And
in the family support cases, where trust incomes likewise have been reached, it is
thought that courts' findings of intentions have been induced by considerations of
public policy. The reason usually given by the courts, however, is that a wife's
right to support arises not from a debt owing by the beneficiary, but from the marital
duty of the husband. 4 Yet the legal duty to support one's family would seem to
be no greater than the duty to pay taxes. In either instance the beneficiary may be
considered under a duty to fulfill a social obligation, as distinguished from a duty
to pay a private debt in which the public has no interest.P His failure to perform
the social obligation leads to extra burdens on the state because it then must sub-
stitute performance, whereas his failure to pay a private creditor, except in a com-
munistic society, works no such immediate hardship on the public. A family de-
serted and destitute must be cared for by the community, and a man who does not
pay taxes becomes likewise a public charge in the indirect sense that he means higher
rates or less returns for those who do.
Viewed in this light, a trust provision specifying that the income should be immune
to support claims of the wife, or to tax claims of the government, would be against
public policy and should be unenforceable.20  In the absence of statute, such provi-
tenance after the trust came into existence. Walter's Case, 278 Pa. 421, 123 At. 403
(1924). See also Ashhurst v. Given, 5 W. & S. 323 (Pa. 1843); Nichols v. Eaton, 91
U. S. 716, 726 (1875). In the principal case it does not appear whether or not the trust
antedates the unpaid back taxes.
20. This is said to be the purpose of the trust in cases where the income is held not
to be assignable by the beneficiary. See Note (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. Rnv. 480.
21. Scott, Control of Property by the Dead 11 (1917) 65 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 632, 633.
22. (1933) 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 1009, 1010.
23. The very multiplicity of vague reasons given suggests that notions of policy, rather
than legalistic rules, are controlling. Wetmore v. Wetmore, 149 N. Y. 520, 529, 44 N. E.
169, 171 (1896); Pruyn v. Sears, 96 Misc. 200, 161 N. Y. Supp. 58 (Sup. Ct. 1916);
Decker v. Directors of Poor, 120 Pa. 272, 13 Ad. 925 (1888).
The fact that some courts have held that trust moneys are not available for alimony
[e.g. Thackara v. Mlintzler, 100 Pa. 151 (1882). Contra: England v. England, 223 IlL. App.
549 (1922); Wetmore v. Wetmore, supra (statute)], and that divorce terminates the wife's
right [Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N. H. 216, 132 Atl. 10 (1926)], affords further indication of
an underlying public policy, it could be argued. A distinction between rights to support and
rights to alimony might be justified not only because divorce terminates a l unal ity
between husband and wife, but also on the ground that a divorce award involves a property
settlement. See (1933) 21 CAZin. L. Rv. 142, 148.
24. England v. England; Wetmore v. Wetmore, both supra note 23. In Moorehead's
Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 551-553, 137 At. 802, 806 (1927), these principles were used, together
with express applications of public policy.
25. England v. England, 223 Ill. App. 549, 555 (1922).
26. In Board of Charities and Correction v. Kennedy, 3 Pa. Dist. R. 231 (1894),
Thayer, J. said, at 232, that if the will had specified that the trust money was not to h
had for the family's support, it would have been void. A similar dictum in Moorehead's
Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 551, 137 At. 802, 805 (1927), may be explained by the existence of
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sions would be invalid if the trust were a contract, or if the testator sought to make
himself the beneficiary 2 7 Moreover, an obvious though inarticulate excuse for up.
holding the spendthrift trust device is that otherwise the beneficiary eventually might
become a public charge, because private creditors would take all the income and
leave the spendthrift with nothing for the necessary expenses of life. Obviously,
with respect to social obligations, the weight of this argument vanishes, for unless
the income is available the public is charged. Although in England there is an alter-
native means of restraining alienation,28 the spendthrift trust is invalid even as against
private debts for the reason that public policy requires that the power of alienation be
a necessary incident to ownership.P And in this country, judicial willingness to cur.
tail "control of property by the dead" should not be wanting, since it is felt that a
man should not be permitted to enjoy the pleasures of property without assuming the
burdens.30 The fact that-the legal estate is in the trustees should not be a valid reason
for giving excepted treatment to a spendthrift trust. In the absence of contravening
statute it could be argued that the beneficiary's right to enforce payment of the in-
come constitutes a property interest in rem, and is therefore subject to alienability
in the same manner as other property. Indeed, it has been said that the whole
doctrine of spendthrift trusts is founded on fallacy in so far as it depends on the
old adage that equity acts in personam and not in ren.3 1 So long as the beneficiary's
equitable interest is enforced,3 2 the right to the proceeds would seem to be no less
a property right than a legal interest would be.3 3 Regarding the principal decision,
it may be explained best in the light of earlier decisions which went to the extreme
in upholding individualistic plans of testators,34 and in the light of the New York
a statute. Comment (1933) 21 CAIFw. L. Rav. 142, 150. See Note (1911) 11 CoL. L.
R.v. 765, 767, for the view that spendthrift trusts are justified where the beneficiary is
incompetent, since otherwise tradesmen would take advantage of him.
27. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts Created in Whole or in Part for the Benefit of the
Settlor (1930) 44 HAnv. L. Rav. 203, 205. See also Evans, The Termination of Trusts
(1928) 37 Y AE L. J. 1070, 1081-83; cf. Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 310 Pa.
301, 165 AUt. 380 (1933), noted in (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 342.
28. Protective trusts were recognized in the Trustee Act of 1925, 15 & 16 GrE. V.
(1925) c. 19, § 33. LEwrN, TRusTs (13th ed. 1928) 144. It was claimed that even
before the Act, the English rule was capable of being as rude to creditors as was the
American spendthrift trust. Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 90, 14 Atl. 497, 500 (1888). For
the protection of a married woman, a "separate use" trust could be established. Tullett
v. Armstrong, 4 Myl. & Cr. 377; Baggett v. Meux, 1 Coll. 138 (1844).
29. Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. Jun. 429, 433, 34 Eng. Rep. 379, 381 (1811); Lrwxu,
op. cit. supra note 28, at 140.
30. Tillinghast v. Bradford, 5 R. L 205, 212 (1858); In re Condon, 198 Fed. 947, 950
(S. D. N. Y. 1912).
31. Horack, supra note 3, at 148.
32. The New York statute, supra note 8, gives the right to enforce.
33. Horack, supra note 3, at 147; Note (1915) 28 HARv. L. Rav. 507. The supposed
origin of the device would indicate that equitable and legal rights were interchangeable,
GRAY, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 214 et seq.; Unkovic, Spendthrift Trusts In Pennsylvania
(1931) 36 Dicx. L. REv. 45, 46.
34. For example, in Mehaffey's Estate, 139 Pa. 276, 281, 20 AtI. 1056 (1891),
the court declared that it is well settled that, by the use of "apt words," a spendthrift
trust can be created which will be immune to "liability for any debts, contracts, or
engagements of the beneficiary." A few courts have gone so far as to excuse the absence
of "apt words." Bennett v. Bennett, 217 Ill. 434, 75 N. E. 339 (1905); Everitt v. Hasklns,
102 Kan. 546, 171 Pac. 632 (1918); Higbee v. Brockenbrough, 191 S. W. 994 (No. 1917);
Stambaugh's Estate, 135 Pa. 585, 191 Atl. 1058 (1890).
statutory limitations which enable creditors to reach surplus income after deducting
expenses necessary for the education and support of the beneficiaryas But the deci-
sion is not in line with the "growing tendency" of courts to restrict the application
of spendthrift provisions.38
RIGHT OF A BANK TO EXERT BANKER's LiEN iN GAm mSH. ET PROCEoRsoS BY
DEPosiToR's JUDGMENT CRsrT0R
A DEPosrrOR was indebted to a bank on two demand notes for the sum of five hun-
dred dollars each. The first of these notes had been made two years before the in-
stant suit; the other four months prior. At the time of the execution of these re-
ceivables, an instrument had been signed by the makers giving the bank a lien on
"any and all funds, moneys, balances ... at any time in the hands of the.., holder
belonging to"' the depositor. The depositor had to her credit two hundred and
twenty dollars on the books of the bank when the instant proceedings were insti-
tuted by the plaintiff, her judgment creditor, who attempted to garnish the sum on
deposit toward the satisfaction of its debt. The bank objected to the garnishment
on the ground that its lien on the deposit foreclosed any rights of intervening credi-
tors. Holding for the garnishor, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that since
the bank had not demanded payment of the demand notes before the plaintiff brought
its action, and since the deposit account had remained under the control of the
debtor-depositor who drew checks that were honored up to the time of garnishment,
no "unexercised lien" could prevent attachment by intervening creditors. In addi-
tion, the court envisaged patent opportunity for fraud and collusion in a situation
which would allow a debtor to defeat creditors by giving his bank a right of lien on
his deposit account, and yet to retain the benefits of controlling the account for his
own use.;
The court's discussion, in the instant case, seems entirely to disregard the actual
relationship between a bank and its deposit customers. Rather it is based on the
unprecise and superficial doctrine, as generally stated in reported cases, that a bank is
a debtor to the customer to the extent of the latter's deposit; and when it honors
a customer's checks, it is therefore entitled to reduce the credit balance of the cus-
tomer's account to indicate that it has paid part or all of the obligation it owes.3
Following this rationale, when in addition to this situation the customer is indebted
to the bank on a matured note or other form of obligation, the courts have uni-
versally allowed the exercise of a "banker's lien,"4 whereby, in order to avoid cir-
35. N. Y. Rnr,. PRop. LAw (1909) § 98. But more than once the effect of this limita-
tion has been practically nullified by application of the 'station in life" rule. Gri-,old,
sutpra note 16, 88-91.
36. Griswold, supra note 16; Scott, Necessitous Circumvention of Sperdt~rfft Truss
(1932) 6 Tr.r. L. Q. 503.
1. This wording is in accord with the usual construction of banker's lien agreement-,
which evidently give to the payee-bank rights of lien over all conceivable assets which
the maker-depositor may have in the bank.
2. Adolph Bergman Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaul (Germantown Trust Co.,
Garnishee), 175 AtL 743 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1934).
3. 5 ic iF, BA w s AND BAuxwG (1932) § 1.
4. Kane v. First National Bank of El Paso, 56 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932);
Blount Sterling National Bank v. Green, 99 Ky. 262, 35 S. W. 911 (1S96); Wiley v.
Bunker Hill National.Bank, 183 Mlass. 495, 67 N. E. 655 (1903); Shuman v. Citizer' Banh
of Rugby, 27 N. D. 599, 147 N. W. 388 (1914); Block v. Amsden, 103 Mluc. 313, 177
N. Y. Supp. 604 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Bank of Jamestown v. Cattaraugus County Bank of
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cuity of action by the cancellation of mutual debts owed in the same capacity,6 the
bank is permitted to offset against its indebtedness to the customer, the debt of the
latter to the bank.0 Such a right need not usually be attended by a specific agreement
between the parties, as existed in the instant case. 7 Notice by the bank to the cus-
tomer that it is about to exercise its power of appropriation upon the credit balance
of the account is not usually required before such appropriation may be made. Thus,
it has been held that mere dishonor of the customer's check is sufficient notice of
the appropriation.8 Nor is actual appropriation through a bookkeeping entry prior to
presentation of a check usually required to validate the exercise of the lien,9 although
a few opinions have created respectable authority to the contrary of this proposition,
on the ground that it would be unjust to the depositor to be kept in ignorance of the
status of his account and thus be hampered in his business dealings.10 From these
Little Valley, 148 Misc. 655, 266 N. Y. Supp. 622 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Goldstein v. Jefferson
Title and Trust Co., 95 Super. Ct. 167 (Pa. 1928); 2 Bor.Lrs, BANxmo (1907) 740;
5 Micum, B~ixs AD B.Axo § 114; Moore and Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods
Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts. I-Legal Method: Banker's Set-Off (1903)
40 YAx.n L. J. 381.
5. For an explanation of the attributes of "mutuality", and the argument of avoidance
of circuity, see Note (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 170, which deals with the analogous situation
of depositor's right of set-off against a bank seeking collection of customer's indebtedness-,
6. The obligation of the customer usually must be matured. First National Bank of
Birmingham v. Mlnge, 186 Ala. 405, 64 So. 957 (1914); Samuels v. Public National Bank
and Trust Co. of New York, 140 Misc. 744, 251 N. Y. Supp. 671 (Mun. Ct. 1931). But
in some instances equity will allow the offset before maturity. Minge v. First National
Bank of Birmingham, 191 Ala. 271, 68 So. 141 (1915). The bank need not exercise the
lien if it wishes to refrain from so doing. Bank of Conway v. Stary, 51 N. D. 399, 200
N. W. 505 (1924). But, if it does not, the obligations of parties secondarily liable on the
note are extinguished. Kerr, Failure of Bank to Apply Maker's Deposit to Overdue Paper
(1921) 92 Cxmr. L. J. 301.
7. Meyers v. New York County National Bank, 36 App. Div. 482, 55 N. Y. Supp.
504 (2d Dep't, 1899); Joske, Bankers' Liens (1931) 5 Ausr. L. J. 148. Contra: Morgan
v. Lathrop, 12 La. Ann. 257 (1857). The lien ordinarily arises from general business
usage. Shuman v. Citizens' Bank "of Rugby, 27 N. D. 599, 147 N. W. 388 (1914); In re
Wilkin's Will, 131 Misc. 188, 226 N. Y. Supp. 415 (Surr. Ct. 1928). In California, the
lien is recognized by statute. Ca. Czv. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 3054; American Surety
Co. of N. Y. v. Bank of Italy, 63 Cal. App. 149, 218 Pac. 466 (1923); DRAxE, A-rAcn-
M zNT (7th ed. 1891) § 532. But when there is specific agreement to the contrary between
bank and customer, specific terms therein may operate to defeat the usual lien. McKean
v. German-American Savings Bank, 118 Cal. 334, 50 Pac. 656 (1897).
8. Bank of Guntersville v. Crayter, 199 Ala. 599, 75 So. 7 (1917); Mount Sterling
National Bank v. Green, 99 Ky. 262, 35 S. W. 911 (1896); Goldstein v. Jefferson Title
& Trust Co., 95 Super. Ct. 167 (Pa. 1928).
9. Shuman v. Citizens' Bank of Rugby, 27 N. D. 599, 147 N. W. 388 (1914); Gold-
stein v. Jefferson Title and Trust Co., 95 Super. Ct. 167 (Pa. 1928).
10. Niblack v. Park National Bank of Chicago, 169 Ill. 517, 48 N. E. 438 (1897);
Callahan v. Bank of Anderson, 69 S. C. 374, 48 S. E. 293 (1904). The decision in Shuman
v. Citizens' Bank of Rugby, 27 N. D. 599, 147 N. W. 388 (1914), which allowed appro-
priation without notice, gave rise to a statute requiring "legal process" or "consent of
the depositor" before the appropriation might be exercised by the bank. N. D. Comp.
LAws AxN. (Supp. 1925) § 5220a. And in the only case in point that seems to have
been decided outside the United States, such notice was required. Dawson v. Bank of
New Zealand, 5 11. S. W. R. 154, 386 (1884). See Moore and Su.4sman, supra note 4,
at 399, 400.
general doctrines, it might be argued that although notice is not usually required for
the exercise of the "lien" as against a depositor, yet the depositor's "balance" in the
bank represents a definite sum of money, and that, in the event of an attachment or
garnishment proceeding, the lien of the attachment would be perfected prior in time
to that of the bank. Therefore, it would seem to follow that the attachment lien
would take precedence over that of the bank.
But these general statements do not adequately analyze the customer-bank rela-
tionship; they are rather a description of the results that will follow in given in-
stances. An analysis of the relationship leads to the conclusion that a bank and cus-
tomer are in a debtor-creditor relationship only when the customer's balance has
been created in part or entirely by a deposit of actual cash. When a customer makes
such a deposit, he is, in effect, loaning his money to the bank in return for a promise
by the bank to extend credit to him up to the extent of his deposit either by honoring
his checks made to the order of a third person or by paying to himself on demand;
and it is mutually agreed that the loans so made by the bank may be cancelled
against the depositor's balance. When the total of these advances by the bank
has completely offset the amount of the deposit, the bank's agreement to lend termi-
nates. But while a credit balance remains, the customer may recover from the bank
the amount of his deposit, or may sue for damages caused by a refusal by the bank
to honor checks according to the agreement. When, however, instead of a deposit
of currency, the customer executes a note to the bank as the basis for an extension
of credit, the relationship is not one of debtor and creditor. Rather, in return for a
promise to repay whatever he has drawn when the note matures, the customer re-
ceives a promise by the bank to advance credit up to the amount of the note during
the time of credit represented thereby. When the withdrawals by the customer equal
the sum of the receivable, the bank's promise has been satisfied. Moreover, a breach
of promise by the bank in refusing to honor the customer's checks before the cus-
tomer's withdrawals have exceeded the amount of the note or before the credit
period has expired, entitles the customer to recover the balance, or to sue for the
damages occasioned by a slander to his credit, just as in the case of a deposit of
currency. In the intermediate situation, where the customer's account is made up
of both a deposit of cash and an agreement by the bank to lend on the basis of the
customer's note, the customer would be a creditor of the bank only to the extent
that his deposit balance exceeded the amount of the credit advanced on his note.u
On this analysis, the question of whether or not the bank must notify a customer
before discontinuing its performance of the agreement to lend by extending credit
is more readily apparent. In the first situation, where the consideration for the bank's
promise to lend is a cash deposit, the bank's refusal to advance further credit nor-
milly would not occur until the agreement to lend had been fully performed through
its payment of withdrawals up to the amount of the deposit. At that point the re-
fusal would be justified, since the bank no longer would be under any obligation
to the customer. But when the credit balance of the account is created by a time
or demand note, there is a time limit to be considered. For, where a time note is
concerned, although the credit period usually extends up to the date of maturity as
specified on the face of the instrument and the bank's duty is then discharged, it may
be argued that a material change in the credit position of the depositor occurring be-
fore that time might terminate the bank's duty to lend when a slight possibility of
repayment by the customer existed.'- And, by the same token, when, as in tha
11. For more incisive analyses of this relationship see Moore and Shamos, Intere-it
on the Balance of Checking Accounts (1927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 633; Moore and Sunsman,
supra note 4.
12. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499 (1892); Parker v. First National Bank, 96




principal case, the basis of the account is a demand note, a fair interpretation of its
consequences seems to be that the bank has agreed to extend credit to the customer
for a period whose termination depends on the bank's option.P3 Consequently, it
would be free to refuse loans at any time without violating the promise it had made
to extend credit. However, such a conclusion does not imply that the bank may sud-
denly terminate its agreement without giving notice to the customer, and yet remain
free from a possible legal penalty; for, were it to terminate the contract in an inequit-
able manner, such as by dishonoring a check of the customer in the hands of a third
person, it would probably be subject to suit for slander of the customer's credit, a
personal ex delicto action. 14
Applying this analysis to the case of the garnishor's rights should cause no con-
fusion. It is generally accepted that the rights of the garnishor are no greater than
those of his principal debtor,' 5 and it is accordingly held that he is subject to the
same claims of the garnishee as might have been asserted against the principal debtor.10
Thus, in the instant case, the bank was free to refuse an advance to the garnishor
as it would be justified in rejecting a request made by the customer. And neither
the issues of notice of appropriation, nor actual appropriation through the machinery
of a book entry, should be involved. For, since there would be no slander of credit
were the customer to be met with a refusal of his personal demand for an advance
of credit in the instant situation, since no third party such as a payee of the cus-
tomer's check is involved, the same is true of a refusal to the garnishor.'T In addi-
tion, were there any doubt to remain of the validity of this conclusion, it is universallv
held that a garnishment proceeding cannot effectuate the transfer of a personal tort
claim of the garnishee to the garnishor.18
Nor do the opportunities for fraud envisaged by the court in the instant case as
arising from the customer's grant to the bank of a "lien" so as to avoid creditors'
levies seem applicable to circumstances similar to the principal situation. The valid-
ity of this argument has been recognized in cases dealing with mortgage liens on actual
tangible property, such as machinery, where the res has remained under the control
of the mortgagor. Intervening creditors have been permitted to attach such prop-
erty despite the existence of the lien because of the continued exercise of dominion by
13. This would seem to follow because the demand note is immediately due upon
execution. Biomow, BrTrS, Norxs, Aw Cn cxs (3d ed. 1928) § 349. Hence, since the
bank would be bound to no definite credit period, as expressed on the face of the note,
its refusal would be legally justified.
14. Shuman v. Citizens' Bank of Rugby, supra note 10, whose decision gave rise to
the statutory requirement of notice, and Dawson v. Bank of New Zealand, supra note 10,
expressing the English view, were both concerned with demand notes.
15. Southern Pacific Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 21 F. (2d) 288 (C. C, A. 2d, 1927);
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. Powell Paving and Construction Co., 139 S. C. 411,
138 S. E. 184 (1927).
16. Ellery v. Cumming, 40 Ariz. 512, 14 P. (2d) 709 (1932); John M. C. Marble Co.
v. Merchants' National Bank of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. App. 347, 115 Pac. 59 (1911); Collins
v. Thuringer, 92 Colo. 433, 21 P. (2d) 709 (1923); First National Bank of Tifton v.
Ramsey-Wheeler Co., 17 Ga. App. 442, 87 S. E. 679 (1916); DnR=., ATrAczuENT § 533;
cf. First National Bank of Auburn v. Eastern Trust and Banking Co., 108 Me. 79, 79 Atl.
4 (1911); Note (1924) 8 Mwir. L. Rzv. 545.
17. People v. St. Nicholas Bank, 44 App. Div. 313, 60 N. Y. Supp. 719 (1st Dep't,
1899) (notice of a prior appropriation declared unnecessary in a situation practically
identical to the instant case).
18. German v. Universal Oil Products Co., 6 F. Supp. 53 (W. D. Mo. 1934); Waples-
Platter Grocer Co. v. Texas and Pacific Ry Co., 95 Tex. 486, 68 S. W. 265 (1902); DRm~m,
ATTACEMNxT § 548; Fixzar, ExEcuTioNs (3d ed. 1900) § 107.
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the mortgagor and the absence of surrender of the subject matter to the mortgagee.10
But any analogy between this situation and the circumstance of an unexercised b3nk-
er's lien would seem to be inappropriate. Because of the usual system of book-
keeping employed by banks in the United States, by virtue of which the amount of
the note, which is the basis of the customer's account, is added onto the credit side
of the ledger immediately upon its execution,20 the situation may, perhaps, become
confusing and lead to the hastily conceived notion that what appears on the credit
side is actually money of the depositor which he has entrusted to the bank, rather
than the symbolic and convenient method of recording the terms of a contract agree-
ment. But, if the same transaction be recorded as an overdraft, according to the
English practice, the account, more realistically, would not be credited at the outset
with the amount which the bank has agreed to lend to the customer, but rather would
be debited as each check was drawn and honored. 21 Such a bookkeeping arrangement
would serve the same purpose equally as well. Thus it is obvious that only where
the customer has made an advanpe of the medium of exchange to the bank, and
hence has given something which before its transfer would have been available to
creditors, does any opportunity for fraud on creditors arise. And in this situation,
only if there is an unmatured debt of the customer to the bank, and the customer's
credit position has not undergone a drastic change, would the bank's claim of prior
appropriation be unjust, since the bank would have no claim against the depositor
at the time of the garnishment and hence none against the garnishor who shares
the customer's rights. But in the instant case, where the debt of the customer was
matured, and no cash item had ever existed in the account, the intervening creditor
could claim no fraud, since no property of the customer had existed upon which a lien
could be placed prior to the bank's refusal to obey the garnishment order.
19. White v. Gunn, 205 Pa. 229, 54 AUt. 901 (1903); Bank of North America v. Penn
Motor Car Co., 235 Pa. 194, 83 At. 622 (1912).
20. See Moore and Sussman, supra note 4, at 385.
21. See Dawson v. Bank of New Zealand, 5 N. S. W. R. 154, 386 (1884); Moore and
Shamos, supra note 11, at 646, 647.
